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In the fall of 2014, Rolling Stone Magazine published an
article describing the rape of a woman at a University of Virginia
fraternity house. The story turned out to be false, and members of
the fraternity sued for defamation. The suit raises an interesting
question: under what circumstances may anonymous individual
members of the fraternity recover? This Note describes the case,
related common and constitutional law, as well as differences in
group defamation doctrine across jurisdictions. After detailing
problems with the existing paradigm, the Note proposes a new
method for performing the analysis.
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INTRODUCTION
For oh, ‘twas nuts to the Father of Lies
(As this wily fiend is named in the Bible)
To find it settled by laws so wise,
That the greater the truth, the worse the libel!1
In November of 2014, Rolling Stone Magazine2 published an
online article entitled “A Rape on Campus: A Brutal Assault and
Struggle for Justice at UVA” (“the Article”).3 The Article, written
as an exposé of rape culture at the University of Virginia (“UVA”)
generated worldwide attention, with its webpage receiving nearly
three million views in the weeks following publication.4 The story
contained a graphic and violent scene, describing the brutal gang
rape5 of a freshman named Jackie during a Phi Kappa Psi6 (“PKP”)

1

8 THOMAS MOORE, A Case of Libel, in THE POETICAL WORKS OF THOMAS MOORE:
COLLECTED BY HIMSELF 221, 224 (1841). Defamation law encompasses both written or
durable expressions known as “libel” and spoken/ephemeral expressions or “slander.”
See infra Section I.C.
2
Rolling Stone is a biweekly magazine founded in 1967 that reports on music,
culture, and politics. Rolling Stone, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com
/topic/Rolling-Stone [https://perma.cc/4ELA-5QL7] (last updated Aug. 24, 2018).
3
Elias v. Rolling Stone LLC (Elias II), 872 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 2017).
4
Id. The article went “viral,” attracting more viewers than any non-celebrity article
ever published by Rolling Stone. Sheila Coronel, Steve Coll & Derek Kravitz, Rolling
Stone’s Investigation: ‘A Failure That Was Avoidable,’ COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Apr.
5, 2015), https://www.cjr.org/investigation/rolling_stone_investigation.php [https://
perma.cc/YZ33-23BH].
5
Rape committed by two or more people against the same victim in the same or
sequential criminal episodes. Gang Rape, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2017).
When large numbers of attackers are involved, it is also termed mass rape. Id.
6
Phi Kappa Psi (“PKP”) is a national collegiate fraternity, founded at the College of
Charleston in 1904. About, PHI KAPPA PSI, http://www.pikapp.org/content.aspx?id=402
[https://perma.cc/7KZG-ANTT] (last visited Apr. 20, 2018).
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date party in the fall of 2012.7 Jackie, who served as the primary
source for the Article, described being thrown through a glass table
and raped at the hands of seven fraternity members while others
watched.8 The story described onlookers encouraging attackers by
exclaiming “[d]on’t you want to be a brother?” and “[w]e all had to
do it, so you do, too.”9 The Article’s author Sabrina Erdely10
reported that UVA responded inappropriately,11 given that two
other women confided that they too had been gang-raped at PKP,
and that a rape occurred there in 1984.12 In a podcast for Slate
magazine (the “Podcast”),13 the Article’s author commented that
the behavior she described “seem[ed] to indicate . . . some kind of
initiation ritual,” and that it appeared “impossible that [fraternity
members] didn’t know about [the rapes].”14
The Article ignited a national debate as well as sizeable
protests on UVA’s campus, with PKP becoming the subject of
7

Elias II, 872 F.3d at 102; Bill Wyman, 5 Takeaways from the Rolling Stone
Defamation Verdict, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.cjr.org
/analysis/rolling_stone_verdict_defamation_case.php [https://perma.cc/TG9K-VCF3].
8
Elias II, 872 F.3d at 102.
9
Id. at 102–03.
10
Sabrina Erdely, a journalist for the Rolling Stone and named defendant in related law
suits, authored the Article and collaborated with Slate to produce a podcast about the
Article’s content. Id. at 97.
11
The Article named Dean Nicole Eramo as being complicit in a system that failed to
adequately respond to rape on campus. Id. at 103. Dean Eramo brought a separate suit in
Virginia against Rolling Stone and Erdely. Eramo v. Rolling Stone, 209 F. Supp. 3d 862,
867 (W.D. Va. 2016).
12
Elias II, 872 F.3d at 103. A rape occurred at the PKP house in 1984 per the
confession of William Beebe twenty-one years later. Liz Seccuro, A History of Violence:
Not Huguely, but the University of Virginia, HUFFINGTON POST, https://
www.huffingtonpost.com/liz-seccuro/a-history-of-violence-not_b_592208.html
[https://perma.cc/6GXB-QWRR] (last updated May 25, 2011). Members of the fraternity
implicated in the confession invoked the Fifth Amendment when questioned about the
incident and never faced charges. Liz Seccuro, I Was Gang Raped at a U-VA Frat 30
Years Ago, and No One Did Anything, THE DAILY BEAST (Dec. 16, 2014, 5:55 AM),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/i-was-gang-raped-at-a-u-va-frat-30-years-ago-and-noone-did-anything [https://perma.cc/2BCP-NG38].
13
Slate magazine interviewed Sabrina Erdely for a podcast (“the Podcast”) related to
the Article on November 20, 2014. Elias II, 872 F.3d at 102–03, 110. Slate is a daily
online magazine founded in 1996 covering politics, news, business, technology, and
culture. About Us, SLATE, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/slate_fare
/2006/08/about_us.html [https://perma.cc/L6XF-9HQH] (last visited Apr. 20, 2018).
14
Elias II, 872 F.3d at 103.
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vilification, vandalism, and ultimately suspension.15 Yet, just
weeks after the Article’s publication, journalists investigating the
incident from the Washington Post, Slate, and other publications
began to question the story.16 The scrutiny revealed Erdely never
verified any of Jackie’s account, sought out the perpetrators, or
spoke to relevant school officials about the incident.17 When
investigators and journalists followed up with Jackie,18 the
inconsistencies in her story became too large to ignore.19 Rolling
Stone’s managing editor issued a public apology: citing
“discrepancies in Jackie’s account,” he concluded “that our trust in
[Jackie] was misplaced.”20 By late March of 2015, the
Charlottesville Virginia police department concluded their
investigation, stating that “[t]here is no substantive basis to support
the account alleged in the [Article].”21 Rolling Stone retracted the
Article just days later in April,22 concurrent to self-publication of a

15

T. Rees Shapiro, Key Elements of Rolling Stone’s U-Va. Gang Rape Allegations in
Doubt, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/uva-fraternity-to-rebut-claims-of-gang-rape-in-rolling-stone/2014/12/05/5fa5f7d2-7c9111e4-84d4-7c896b90abdc_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.770fb4b98e3e
[https://perma.cc/89HT-7Q4P].
16
Elias II, 872 F.3d at 103; see Allison Benedikt & Hanna Rosin, The Missing Men:
Why Didn’t a Rolling Stone Writer Talk to the Alleged Perpetrators of a Gang-Rape at
the University of Virginia?, SLATE (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles
/double_x/doublex/2014/12/sabrina_rubin_erdely_uva_why_didn_t_a_rolling_stone_writ
er_talk_to_the_alleged.html [https://perma.cc/2SUD-4RBS]; T. Rees Shapiro, Key
Elements of Rolling Stone’s U-Va. Gang Rape Allegations in Doubt, WASH. POST (Dec.
5, 2014), http://wapo.st/1vnF3ed?tid=ss_mail&utm_term=.770fb4b98e3e [https://
perma.cc/89HT-7Q4P].
17
Bill Wyman, 5 Takeaways from the Rolling Stone Defamation Verdict, COLUM.
JOURNALISM
REV.
(Nov.
29,
2016),
https://www.cjr.org/analysis
/rolling_stone_verdict_defamation_case.php [https://perma.cc/WVV6-JWAB].
18
T. Rees Shapiro, Key Elements of Rolling Stone’s U-Va. Gang Rape Allegations in
Doubt, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/uva-fraternity-to-rebut-claims-of-gang-rape-in-rolling-stone/2014/12/05/5fa5f7d2-7c9111e4-84d4-7c896b90abdc_story.html?utm_term=.9945e3f4634a [https://perma.cc/89HT7Q4P]. Jackie stuck to her story throughout the ordeal. Id.
19
Id. For example, Jackie was initially unable to provide and later to spell the name of
a man involved in the attack. Coronel et al., supra note 4.
20
Elias II, 872 F.3d at 103.
21
Coronel et al., supra note 4 (“This finding, said Police Chief Timothy Longo,
‘doesn’t mean that something terrible didn’t happen to Jackie that night.’”).
22
Id.
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report detailing the erroneous journalistic practices that led to
publication.23
Even before the conclusion of formal investigations and
Rolling Stone’s retraction, the Article induced public speculation
as to who could recover in tort for damages resulting from
publication.24 As it turned out, a variety of plaintiffs sued Erdely
and Rolling Stone, and many of the resulting suits settled out of
court.25 However, the claims of three individual fraternity members
would test the limits of which defamation claims were actionable.
Initially, U.S. Southern District Judge P. Kevin Castel held that the
students did not have a claim.26 The court accepted the defense
argument that individuals cannot sue when the defamatory
statement simply casts aspirations on a group of which the
plaintiffs were members.27 Surprisingly, the Second Circuit
reversed the lower court and, taking a bold doctrinal step, held that
the student plaintiffs successfully stated a claim.28
Elias v. Rolling Stone LLC therefore stands as an emblem of
the problem of group libel: under what circumstances should
courts permit claims to proceed?29 Can the size of the group
determine whether a plaintiff should be permitted to recover? What
if the plaintiff is not named, but can be identified by people
familiar with the circumstances? In deciding this question of law,
what factual evidence should be weighed to make the
determination? Relatedly, how should courts reconcile the need to
set right the victims of group defamation with the need to protect
speech about groups?

23

Id. The report, commissioned by Rolling Stone and conducted by the Dean of the
prestigious Columbia University School of Journalism, outlined the journalistic and
editorial failures resulting in the publication of the Article’s account. Id.
24
See Eugene Volokh, Libel Law and the Rolling Stone / UVA Alleged Gang Rape
Story, WASH. POST, (Dec. 6, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2014/12/06/libel-law-and-the-rolling-stone-uva-alleged-gang-rapestory/?utm_term=.6b5678419492 [https://perma.cc/YL37-CELC].
25
See infra Section II.D.
26
Elias v. Rolling Stone LLC (Elias I), 192 F. Supp. 3d 383, 392–99 (S.D.N.Y. 2016),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 872 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2017).
27
Id.
28
See Elias II, 872 F.3d 97, at 105–11 (2d Cir. 2017).
29
Id.
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In considering these questions, defamation law generally limits
claims brought by individuals following the defamation of their
group.30 Two approaches have developed for resolving when to
make an exception and permit individual recovery following
defamation of groups and anonymous group members. The Second
Circuit’s decision in Elias31 calls to attention the two competing
approaches. The majority32 of states adhere to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts (“the Restatement”) position, which contains a
presumptive requirement that groups contain twenty-five or fewer
members for individuals to recover.33 New York and Oklahoma
reject the Restatement approach for a more plaintiff-friendly
standard called the “Intensity of Suspicion” test.34
In Elias, the Second Circuit applied the Intensity of Suspicion
test in a manner that would permit every member of PKP to
recover individually,35 where the defamatory material named none
of the plaintiffs directly.36 Because the number of group members
30

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“As a
general rule no action lies for publication of defamatory words concerning a large group
or class of persons.”); see also ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION § 2:9.4, at 2–160
(5th ed. 2017) (describing policy reasons for the rule, namely that permitting members of
groups to recover with no restriction would cause proliferation of unwarranted litigation,
with resultant damage to the free speech).
31
Elias II, 872 F.3d at 108–09. In Elias II, the Second Circuit overturned the Southern
District of New York’s decision in Elias I, 192 F. Supp. 3d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) to
dismiss the plaintiff’s defamation case on a 12(b)6 motion. Id. at 111. The suit and appeal
arose as the result of the Article’s content.
32
The author researched current law at the time this Note was written in April of 2018.
In some states adopting the Restatement position, there has been discussion, but never
application or adoption of the alternative “intensity of suspicion” approach. See, e.g.,
Pratt v. Nelson, 164 P.3d 366, 383 (Utah 2007) (rejecting the notion that the size of the
group bars a claim and discussing the intensity of suspicion test in footnote 114 of the
case). See Granger v. Time, Inc., 568 P.2d 535, 539 (Mont. 1977) (evaluating and
rejecting a claim concerning a group of approximately 200 persons based on the number
of group members).
33
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. b; see infra Section II.B. for a
discussion of the Restatement position and the presumptive limit of twenty-five
group members.
34
The Intensity of Suspicion test, while considering group size, does not apply the
Restatement’s twenty-five-person limit. See infra Section II.C.
35
Elias II, 872 F.3d at 110 (“Because the [defamatory material] plausibly implied that
all fraternity brothers knew about the alleged rapes, Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that
they were defamed because they were members of the fraternity at the relevant time.”).
36
Id. at 101, 108.
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in Rolling Stone exceeded twenty-five, it is very unlikely that such
a claim would succeed in any of the states adopting the majority
Restatement (Second) position.37 Such a result illustrates the
argument that defamation law’s complexity promotes inconsistent
outcomes, and invites a discussion of how to best address group
defamation cases.38
This Note examines both the Restatement position and the
Intensity of Suspicion Test, ultimately concluding that neither is
completely satisfactory. Part I discusses defamation law generally.
Part II discusses the two competing approaches to group
defamation, then narrows to a discussion of the Elias decision.
Finally, Part III proposes a novel test (“the Test”) for resolving
group defamation problems and associated First Amendment
concerns, and applies the analysis to Elias.
I. A CONCISE BACKGROUND OF DEFAMATION LAW
American defamation law arises from the interplay between
state-level common law and constitutional restrictions on liability
developed following the Supreme Court’s decision in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan.39 The resulting body of law, notorious for
inconsistencies and complexity, is the topic of the following
sections.40 Section I.A describes the early features of American
defamation law. Section I.B provides an overview of the
constitutional aspects of the tort. Modern common law elements
37

See infra Section II.B.
See SACK, supra note 30, at li–liv.
39
376 U.S. 254 (1964); see generally ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN
CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1st ed. 1991).
40
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION, § 1:1 (2d ed. 2017). Barron Pollock
described defamation as “perplexed with minute and barren distinctions.” SIR FRANCIS
POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 220 (5th ed. 1895). Prosser notes that “there is a great deal
in the law of defamation which makes no sense.” W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 771, § 111 (5th ed. 1984). Prosser, a famous legal scholar,
developed strict products liability in addition to publishing The Law of Torts, a widely
recognized and authoritative work on the subject of torts. See generally WILLIAM L.
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter PROSSER’S TORTS]; William L.
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L. J.
1099 (1960). Prosser also served as Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS at v.
38
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are discussed in Section I.C. Finally, Section I.D covers the “of
and concerning” element and its First Amendment implications.
A. Common Law Origins
Historically, American culture relegated defamation law to
relative obscurity.41 Disdain for feudalistic concepts of honor and
nobility, a lack of remedy for emotional injury at tort law, and
fundamental appreciation of free speech contributed to its lack of
preeminence.42 Despite societal ambivalence, courts of the preconstitutional43 era were quite receptive to claims, in what was
essentially a strict liability tort.44
The original Restatement (First) of Torts, published in 1938,
proposed that “[t]o create liability for defamation there must be an
unprivileged publication of false and defamatory matter of
another . . . .”45 The First Restatement defined any statement that
“tends [] to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from
associating or dealing with him” as defamatory.46 Damages were
presumed, and no showing of harm to reputation was necessary,
only that the statement “tend[s] to have such an effect.”47 A
plaintiff needed to demonstrate only that the speech was
defamatory, and that the defendant published it, to plead a prima
facie case.48 The falsity of the statement was also presumed, and
truth was an affirmative defense that the defendant needed to assert
and prove.49 Constitutional developments would eventually
dispense with or modify much of the permissive common law
framework of the early twentieth century.50

41

SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 1:4.
Id.
43
“Pre-constitutional,” meaning prior to the Supreme Court’s Decision in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
44
SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 1:4.
45
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1938).
46
Id. § 559.
47
Id. § 559, cmt. d.
48
SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 1:8.
49
Id.
50
See infra Sections I.B., II.B.
42
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B. First Amendment Law
Defamation law’s protections of reputation necessarily
encroach on the unfettered right to speak, write, and otherwise
express oneself.51 Accordingly, American defamation law cannot
be understood without an overview of First Amendment principles
elaborated by the Supreme Court over the past sixty years. Current
law developed over the course of four ‘waves’ of seminal rulings,
discussed below52: the first placed a restriction on defamation
claims brought by public officials,53 the second expanded
restrictions to public figure plaintiffs,54 the third described new
standards for private plaintiffs,55 and the fourth reversed some
protections developed by the first three.56 Following an overview
of each decision, this Section considers the definition of important
terms57 described in these cases as well as standards for the burden
of proof.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan58 placed the first constitutional
restrictions on defamation law in 1964. The controversy arose at
the height of the civil rights movement.59 At the time, The New
York Times, having a circulation of just 400 subscribers in
Alabama, ran an advertisement designed to elicit sympathy for
civil rights demonstrators facing violent repression across the
51

SACK, supra note 30, § 1:1–2. “Whatever is added to the field of libel is taken from
the field of free debate.” Id. (quoting Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir.
1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 678 (1942)).
52
SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 1:16.
53
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964); see also infra Section I.B,
notes 58–70 and accompanying text.
54
Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967); Associated Press v. Walker,
389 U.S. 28 (1967); see infra notes 71–78 and accompanying text for a discussion of
these cases.
55
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 343–47 (1974).
56
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759–61 (1985);
see infra notes 107–13 and accompanying text. The extent to which First Amendment
protections were actually rolled back remains a matter of debate. See SACK, supra note
30, § 1:2.7, at 1–23.
57
The relevant terms include “public figure,” “pubic official,” “public controversy,”
“public issue,” and “actual malice.” See SACK, supra note 30, §§ 1:2.7, 1:4, 1:5; see also
infra notes 67–69, 90–93 and accompanying text.
58
376 U.S. at 256, 279–80, 283.
59
See Leland Ware, Civil Rights and the 1960s: A Decade of Unparalleled Progress,
72 MD. L. REV. 1087, 1088–92 (2013) (describing major civil rights events of the era
which would serve as the backdrop to New York Times).
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south.60 Statements in the advertisement were either exaggerated or
outright wrong.61 Mr. Sullivan, the Commissioner of Public Affairs
for the City of Montgomery, brought suit for defamation in
Alabama, and a jury awarded damages of $500,000.62 In essence,
New York Times considered the (arguably obvious) use of
defamation law to suppress unpopular speech.63
New York Times declared that the need for “free political
discussion . . . is a fundamental principle of our constitutional
system,” and that criticism of the government cannot be punished
by defamation law.64 Further, discussion of individual public
officials65 must remain protected, even in the face of “vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials.”66 Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court
declared that defamation suits brought by public officials must be
supported by “actual malice,” a term of art.67 Actual malice is
defined as “knowledge that [the defamatory expression] was false
or reckless disregard of whether it was false or not,”68 and must be
proven to the standard of “convincing clarity.”69 In addition, the
Court found that Commissioner Sullivan failed to present sufficient

60

See LEWIS, supra note 39 for a history of the events surrounding New York Times.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 258–59.
62
Id. at 256. At the time, the Supreme Court was aware that there were “eleven libel
suits by local and state officials against the Times seeking $5,600,000” and other similar
suits against the press. Id. at 278 n.18, 294–95 (Black, J., concurring).
63
See id. at 270–71.
64
Id. at 254, 269 (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
65
The definition of “public official” has been refined, to some extent, in Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, so as to include most, but not all, public employees. 443 U.S. 111, 119 n.8
(1989); see also Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 560 (Utah 1988) (holding that not all public
employees are “public officials” and that those who are “public officials” do not have that
legal status for every kind of defamation, and noting that “[t]he employee’s position must
be one which would invite public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it,
entirely apart from the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by the particular charges in
controversy.” (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 n.13 (1966))).
66
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (citing Terminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4
(1949); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937)).
67
Id. at 279–80.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 285–86. “Convincing clarity” is substantially more rigorous than the “by
preponderance evidence” previously employed, but less than the “beyond a reasonable
doubt” standard used in criminal proceedings. See SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 2:3.
61
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evidence that the defamation concerned him, a concept central to
group defamation, discussed below in Section I.D.70
Just three years after New York Times, the Supreme Court
considered two companion cases, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts71
and Associated Press v. Walker.72 Both cases involved the review
of large libel verdicts in which the plaintiffs were well known but
were not government or public officials.73 The Court weighed
whether to decide such public figure74 cases by elevated standards
akin to those devised for public officials in New York Times.75 The
ruling answered affirmatively, adding another class of plaintiff to
those required to make an elevated showing of fault.76 Justice
Harlan wrote for the plurality, attempting to establish a slightly
different standard for public figures, but his position never
achieved controlling status.77 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. resolved
ambiguity created by Justice Harlan’s unique public figure
standard.78
Gertz79 established modern standards for defamation by
affirming the “actual malice” standard for public persons80 and
resolving, at least for a time, whether the “actual malice”
requirement applied in private figure cases.81 The ruling was
70
“[T]he evidence was constitutionally defective in another respect: it was incapable
of supporting the jury’s finding that the allegedly libelous statements were made ‘of and
concerning’ respondent.” Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 288.
71
388 U.S. 130 (1967).
72
389 U.S. 28 (1967).
73
Wally Butts was a college football coach and General Walker was a political
activist. See Curtis Publ’g Co., 388 U.S. at 135–36, 140.
74
The definition of public figures evolved over a series of cases, discussed below in
notes 89–91 and the accompanying text.
75
See Curtis Publ’g Co., 388 U.S. at 146; see also Sullivan, 376 U.S. at
279–80.
76
Curtis Publ’g Co., 388 U.S. at 155.
77
Justice Harlan’s plurality position caused confusion, since the standard describing “a
showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the
standards of investigation and reporting” is significantly different from the “actual
malice” standard described in New York Times. See Curtis Publ’g Co., 388 U.S. at 155.
78
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 343–44 (1974). The Gertz court held that
public figures and public officials would both be held to the “actual malice” standard. Id.
79
Id.
80
“Public persons” includes both public figures and public officials. See supra, notes
65–76 and accompanying text.
81
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346.
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complex. Writing for the court, Justice Powell rejected the
defendant’s contention that the “actual malice” standard applies
whenever the statement involved an issue of public concern,
regardless of whether the plaintiff was a private figure.82 The
ruling did not, however, leave private figure cases unaffected by
the First Amendment.83 Instead, Powell held that a minimum
negligence requirement must be satisfied in private figure
actions,84 agreeing with the defendant’s argument that strict, or
faultless, liability available at common law did not meet American
constitutional standards.85 Adding further complexity, Gertz
declared that even in private plaintiff cases, the recovery of
presumed or punitive damages was prohibited without proof of
“actual malice,” and, indeed, that absent a showing of “actual
malice,” proof of “actual harm”86 was required in such cases.87
With so much riding on the public figure/private figure
distinction, courts put forward number of attempts to differentiate
public from private persons, with one describing the analysis as
“trying to nail a jelly fish to the wall.”88 The Gertz court described
two categories of public figures: universal public figures,89 and
limited purpose or vortex public figures.90 Universal, or allpurpose public figures occupy “positions of persuasive power and
influence” and must meet the “actual malice” requirement for
82

Id.
Id. at 347–48.
84
Id. at 348. The Gertz court never actually used the word “negligence,” but instead
prohibited liability “without fault.” Id. at 347. Lower courts have generally interpreted
this term to mean “negligence.” See Troman v. Wood, 340 N.E.2d 292, 299 (Ill. 1975).
This ruling left states free to set their own standards, provided that private-figureplaintiffs now proved, at a minimum, that a defendant had acted with some degree of
fault. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347–48.
85
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345–48.
86
Defined as including, but not limited to, special or pecuniary damage, which
includes general damage to reputation, personal anguish, humiliation, and suffering. Id. at
349–50; see also infra notes 155–56 and accompanying text.
87
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351–52. This, as well as other restrictions, would be significantly
diminished in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759–61 (1985); see also infra notes 107–14 and accompanying text.
88
Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976),
aff’d, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978).
89
Such figures are “universally” subject to the New York Times standard and include
persons generally recognized by the public as celebrities. SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 2:77.
90
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 352.
83
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nearly all subject matters.91 While a ‘a larger than life’ celebrity
fits the archetypical definition of the universal public figure,92
courts have also treated corporations,93 universities,94 and
individuals who attain the necessary status within their
communities as universal public figures.95 Vortex public figures
must meet the “actual malice” requirement only where defamed in
connection to public controversies in which they participate.96
Public interest97 alone does not define a public controversy: the
matter must achieve open debate in the public forum and have
foreseeable and significant consequences for nonparticipants.98
Whether the plaintiff voluntarily participated in the controversy
also plays a role in determining limited public figure status.99
91
Id. Courts have found famous surfers, political candidates, and pornographic
actresses to be universal public figures. See Manzari v. Associated Newspapers Ltd., 830
F.3d 881, 888–89 (9th Cir. 2016); Chapman v. Journal Concepts, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d
1081, 1095 (D. Haw. 2007), aff’d on other grounds, 401 F. App’x 243 (9th Cir. 2010);
Dolcefino v. Turner, 987 S.W.2d 100, 110 (Tex. App. 1998), aff’d sub nom. Turner v.
KTRK Television, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. 2000).
92
SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 2.77.
93
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron’s, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1347–48 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
94
Ithaca Coll. v. Yale Daily News Publ’g Co., 433 N.Y.S.2d 530, 533–34 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1980), affd on other grounds, 445 N.Y.S.2d 621 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
95
Williams v. Pasma, 202 Mont. 66, 74, 656 P.2d 212, 216 (1982); see also Lluberes
v. Uncommon Prods., LLC, 663 F.3d 6, 20 (1st Cir. 2011) (commenting that “some
courts . . . have extrapolated . . . that a general-purpose public figure need not attain
‘nationwide fame,’ only ‘notoriety where he was defamed . . . .’”).
96
See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345; SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 2:16.
97
Public interest is defined as “[t]he general welfare of a populace considered as
warranting recognition and protection.” Public Interest, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th
ed. 2017). Public interest is, however, relevant to the analysis, as the defamatory
statement must concern a matter of public interest to qualify for the requirement of
negligence at trial. See infra, notes 107–13 and accompanying text.
98
Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
99
See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 134–36 (1979) (finding that plaintiff was
not a vortex public figure despite “voluntarily” applying for public funding of his
research, which the defendant ridiculed); Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 443
U.S. 157, 166–69 (1979) (reasoning that plaintiff was not a vortex public figure because
his participation was involuntary and there was no controversy); Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448, 454–55 (1976) (finding that socialite plaintiff was neither a universal
public figure nor a vortex public figure for “voluntarily” entering a controversy by
initiating litigation); see also Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. N.Y. Times Co., 842 F.2d
612, 617 (2d Cir. 1988) (explaining that in order to receive public figure treatment,
plaintiff must “(1) successfully invite[] public attention to his views in an effort to
influence others prior to the incident that is the subject of litigation; (2) voluntarily
inject[] himself into a public controversy related to the subject of the litigation; (3)
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Nevertheless, courts have found involuntary participants to be
limited purpose public figures in certain circumstances.100
Whether and when groups qualify as public figures presents an
intriguing question.101 In the case of vortex public figures, courts
have generally found numerous groups that involved themselves in
controversies pertinent to the defamation to be public figures.102
The issue has been, at least tangentially, addressed as courts
evaluate how to treat corporations, which have received varied
treatment.103 Some courts always subject corporations to the New
York Times standard on the grounds that they have no personal
reputation, anytime the defamation addresses a relevant matter of
public interest.104 Others reject this approach and seek to determine
assume[] a position of prominence in the public controversy; and (4) maintain[] regular
and continuing access to the media”).
100
Gertz notes that “it may be possible for someone to become a public figure through
no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public figures must
be exceedingly rare.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974); see Street v.
Nat’l Broad. Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1234–35 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 815
(1981), cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1095 (1981) (finding a victim in a notorious rape case
who gave press interviews and promoted her version of the story to be a public figure);
Dameron v. Wash. Magazine, Inc., 779 F.2d 736, (D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding an air traffic
controller on duty when an airplane crashed held to be a public figure, despite his not
seeking attention); see also Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297–98 (establishing three factors
for determining public figure status: 1. Is there a public controversy? 2. Has the plaintiff
played a sufficiently central role in the controversy? and 3. Is the alleged defamatory
statement relevant to the plaintiff’s participation in the controversy? The court also noted
that that “unless [the involuntary participant] rejects any role in the debate, he too has
‘invited comment’ relating to the issue at hand.”). A central reason for recognizing
involuntary public figures is to prevent an “end run” around constitutional protections.
See, e.g., Brewer v. Memphis Publ’g Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1257–58 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 962 (1981) (holding that Elvis Presley’s ex-girlfriend and her husband
were public figures for the purposes of a defamatory article, despite her husband’s
involuntary and attenuated connection to the public controversy). But cf. Wells v. Liddy,
186 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1118 (2000) (holding that the
plaintiff’s bad luck of being wiretapped by the Watergate burglars did not qualify her as a
public figure even while accepting the possibility, generally, of an involuntary public
figure).
101
See, e.g., SACK, supra note 30, § 5:3.5 (listing a brokerage, a private corporation in
charge of corrections centers, Trump University, a law school, and various organizations
as being found to be limited purpose public figures).
102
Id.
103
See id. § 5:3.7.
104
Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 955
(D.D.C. 1976).
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whether the corporation is itself “public” by querying whether the
company engaged in the promotion and sale of securities.105 Still
others look to case specific factors, such as whether the
corporation sought publicity, as in the case of advertisements, in
making the determination.106 Overall, authorities provide little
clarity in the public/private figure determination when resolving
how to treat groups.
A more recent chapter in the development of Supreme Court
defamation jurisprudence significantly altered First Amendment
protections. The Court’s decision in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders107 effectively did away with the “actual
malice” requirement where statements “do not involve matters of
public concern.”108 The issue before the court was whether a
business inaccurately reported as bankrupt by a credit service
needed to prove “actual malice” in order to recover.109 While the
Gertz court would answer in the affirmative, the Dun & Bradstreet
court answered in the negative, reasoning that the report did not
address a matter of public concern.110 The ruling left unanswered
whether Gertz’s prohibition of liability without fault applies when
statements are not of public concern,111 and how to define such
105
See, e.g., Ampex Corp. v. Cargle, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863, 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)
(holding that the determination rests on whether the corporation is (1) publicly traded, (2)
the number of investors, and (3) whether the company promoted itself via press releases).
106
Nat’l Found. for Cancer Research, Inc. v. Council of Better Bus. Bureaus, 705 F.2d
98, 101–02 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 830 (1983); Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v.
Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1980).
107
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985). See
SACK, supra note 30, § 5:3.3 for a discussion of when the “vortex” or “limited purpose”
public figure standard applies.
108
Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 751, 763. The New York Times “actual malice”
standard applies to public officials, and public figures, but only when the statements are
about “issues of public concern.” Id.
109
Id. at 751, 757.
110
The dissent in Dun & Bradstreet highlights the difficulty of sorting cases based on
the “matters of public concern” criterion: Justice Brennan (dissenting) wrote that because
the credit report concerned a public corporation, the false information was in fact a matter
of public concern. Id. at 787.
111
See SMOLLA, supra note 40, §§ 1:20, 3:17. Smolla interprets Dun & Bradstreet as
suggesting that the plurality would endorse a return to strict liability in private figure
cases not involving matters of public concern. Id. The First Circuit noted that the First
Amendment does not protect all defamation cases. Galarneau v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Inc., 504 F.3d 189, 199 (1st Cir. 2007).
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statements. Later rulings established that statements involve
matters of public concern when they relate to keeping the
community informed on important civic and social issues.112
Determining whether speech addresses a matter of public concern
depends on “content, form and context,” accounting for important
linguistic and social considerations.113
While discussions of torts best explain the cause of action with
an initial disclosure of the elements, defamation law’s unique
constitutional aspects limit the value of such an approach.114 To
summarize, the constitutional features of defamation law change
requirements for the plaintiff based on four factors: the identity of
the defendant,115 the identity of the plaintiff, the character of the
defamatory statement, and requirements of the jurisdiction whose
law applies.116 Where circumstances do not call for the imposition
of minimum standards of fault and proof, states are free to
establish their own.117 Nevertheless, many states, as well as the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (the “Restatement”), incorporate

112

Specifically, matters of public concern are “any matter of political, social, or other
concern to the community.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
113
Id. at 147–48.
114
SACK, supra note 30, § 2:1.
115
Courts are divided on whether Gertz applies to suits against non-media defendants,
with the Dun & Bradstreet opinion seeming to eschew such a distinction. Dun &
Bradstreet, 472 U.S at 772–74, 781 (White, J., concurring) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See,
e.g., Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 740 F.3d 1284, 1290–91 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying
Gertz to a blog post).
116
“A defamation case does not putter along as a state law case in its earliest stages,
only to suddenly acquire First Amendment implication upon the tender of an affirmative
defense . . . . [The Supreme] Court [has] infused the state common law of defamation
with a constitutional dimension . . . .” Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 427 F.3d 253, 254–55
(4th Cir. 2001) (Wilkingson, J., dissenting form denial of rehearing en banc), cert.
denied, 547 U.S. 1040 (2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
117
The Supreme Court has not decided whether fault is required for recovery in private
plaintiff cases concerning statements outside of public concern. See Dun & Bradstreet,
472 U.S. at 773–74 (White, J., concurring) (presenting the view that Gertz’s requirement
would be inapplicable in private concern, private figure cases); see also Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (mentioning in dicta that the [fault]
requirement does not apply to private plaintiffs unless the matter is of public concern).
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aspects of the Court’s jurisprudence into the law regardless of
whether they are technically required.118
C. Elements of the Modern Tort
Bearing in mind the influence of First Amendment restrictions
on recovery,119 the elements of defamation detailed below provide
a useful checklist of issues to be addressed. The Restatement
describes the following components, common to many
jurisdictions,120 as necessary for defamation actions:
(a) A false and defamatory statement concerning
another;
(b) An unprivileged publication to a third party;
(c) Fault amounting at least to negligence on the
part of the publisher; and
(d) Either actionability of the statement irrespective
of special harm or the existence of special harm
caused by the publication.121
The first element contains three important terms, including that
the statement be false,122 defamatory, and concerning another.
Falsity is frequently required at common law, and a prerequisite

118

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558(c) (AM. LAW. INST. 1977)
(requiring fault at a minimum, a standard absent from the common law and previous
Restatement (First) of Torts, described in Section I.A.).
119
Restrictions on recovery include elevated fault/proof standards for public persons
and a minimum fault standard for private persons where statements concern public
matters. See supra Section I.B. “Because the common law of defamation, federal
constitutional law, and the constitutional law of the various states reflect many of the
same underlying principles and adopt similar propositions, it is often unclear to what
extent a court decision relies on each.” TMJ Implants, Inc. v. Aetna, Inc., 498 F.3d 1175,
1182 (10th Cir. 2007).
120
The Restatement (Second) elements share much in common with those devised
statutorily or at common law in each state. See SACK, supra note 30, § 2:1, at 2–6.
121
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558.
122
Because opinion cannot be proven false, the court must determine whether the
defamatory material conveys fact or non-actionable opinion. SMOLLA, supra note 40, §
4:38 (“It is, after all, the court’s responsibility to distinguish non-actionable ‘obscenities,
vulgarities, insults, epithets, name-calling . . . verbal abuse . . . and statements of
rhetorical hyperbole’ from true defamatory language.”) (citing McCausland v. City of
Atlantic City, 2006 WL 1451060 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006)) (internal
quotations omitted).
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for recovery as a matter of constitutional law.123 Originally, the
falsity of the statement was presumed, and the burden rested with
the defendant to prove its truth.124 While presumed falsity remains
available in some jurisdictions for some private figure plaintiffs,125
all cases governed by elevated First Amendment requirements
place the burden of proving falsity on the injured party.126 In
addition to falsity, the first element also requires that the statement
be defamatory. Defamation deals with expressions127 that tend to
injure reputation.128 The precise definition and extent to which a
statement must be capable of damaging reputation129 varies by
123

See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
124
SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 1:8.
125
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
126
This includes the majority of cases, specifically when there are public-figure
plaintiffs, public-official plaintiffs, or private plaintiffs when suing media defendants
over matters of public concern. Many courts reject the media/non-media distinction. See
supra notes 51–116 and accompanying text. Notice that private plaintiffs may not be
governed by Gertz if the defendant is not a member of the media or the statement is too
far removed from the factors that give the plaintiff public status. Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. at 74 (1964); see SACK, supra note 30, §§ 2:1.1, 5:2–5:3.10; see also supra
Section I.B.
127
While defamatory statements are usually words, nonverbal communication such as a
drawing or photograph may also be defamatory. See Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 247,
250–51 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding that a photograph is capable of defamatory meaning
when published in an erotic magazine); Burton v. Crowell Publ’g Co., 82 F.2d 154, 155–
56 (2d Cir. 1936) (finding that an advertisement with a photo containing optical illusions
and graphics is capable of defamatory expression).
128
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (defining
defamatory communication as that which “tends so to harm the reputation of another as
to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from
associating or dealing with him”).
129
As a threshold matter, the judge determines whether a statement may sustain
defamatory meaning. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 614 (“(1) The court determines
(a) whether a communication is capable of bearing a particular meaning, and (b) whether
that meaning is defamatory.”); SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 4:38; see also Biro v. Condé
Nast, 883 F. Supp. 2d 441, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Celle v. Filipino Reporter Enters.
Inc., 209 F.3d 163, 177 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted). The factfinder must
ultimately decide whether the communication was understood by its actual recipient as
defamatory. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 614 (“(2) The jury determines whether
a communication, capable of a defamatory meaning, was so understood by its
recipient.”); see also Levin v. McPhee, 119 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing James v.
Gannett Co., 353 N.E.2d 834, 837–38 (N.Y. 1976)). When there is ambiguity about the
meaning and effect of the words, the question is for the jury. SMOLLA, supra note 40, §
4:38; see Golden Bear Distrib. Sys. of Texas, Inc. v. Chase Revel, Inc., 708 F.2d 944, 948
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jurisdiction.130 Interestingly, this element requires inquiry into
whether the statement would tend to injure the plaintiff, not
whether it actually caused injury.131 A showing that the statement
tends to injure substitutes for proof of a causal link between
harmful behavior and injury commonly required in other torts.132
Finally, the first element requires that the statement concern the
plaintiff, a concept central to group defamation discussed in
Section I.D below.
The second element, unprivileged publication, pertains to
whether the defamatory thoughts are expressed purposely or
negligently to a third party.133 Every distinct publication gives rise
to a new cause of action.134 A plaintiff does not need to prove
publication with respect to specific recipients, only that third

(5th Cir. 1983) (“If a defamatory meaning may exist, then the statement or article is
considered ambiguous, and the court must allow the jury to determine whether an
ordinary reader would perceive the statement as defamatory.”) (internal
citations omitted).
130
In New York, defamation is defined as “words which tend to expose one to public
hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism,
degradation or disgrace, or to induce an evil opinion of on in the minds of right-thinking
persons, and to deprive one of their confidence and friendly intercourse in society.”
Kimmerle v. N.Y. Evening Journal, Inc., 186 N.E. 217, 218 (N.Y. 1933). Others have
defined defamatory statements as those which “expose[] a person to hatred, contempt,
ridicule, or obloquy, or which cause[] him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a
tendency to injure him in his occupation.” Madison v. Yunker, 589 P.2d 126, 130 (Mont.
1978) (quoting Lewis v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 512 P.2d 702, 705 (Mont. 1973)).
131
This idiosyncrasy originates from both the difficulty of proving actual damage to
reputation and reflects that some jurisdictions allow recovery for non-reputational
(emotional) injury. SACK, supra note 30, §§ 2:4.1–2:4.17.
132
See David A. Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 747, 751 (1984).
133
In other parts of this Note, the third party may be referred to as the “consumer” or
“reader” of the defamatory material. Merely thinking, writing down, or sharing
defamatory thoughts with the defamer’s target (or his agent, in some jurisdictions) cannot
give rise to a defamation claim, since such private insults cannot result in harm to
reputation. Mims v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 200 F.2d 800, 802 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 940 (1953); Turner v. Boy Scouts of Am., 856 N.E.2d 106, 111 (Ind. Ct. App.
2006).
134
See Pruis v. Bosse, 912 F. Supp. 104, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting Barber v. Daly,
586 N.Y.S.2d 398, 400 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)). Republications must be distinct, and
identical ones are treated as a single publication to prevent the statute of limitations from
tolling, for example, with each sale of a book. See SMOLLA, supra note 40,
§§ 4:91–4:93.50.
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parties received and understood it.135 The manner of publication,
aside from determining whether libel or slander,136 does not
usually prevent liability: courts have found drawings, gestures,137
and other communicative media138 capable of carrying defamatory
meaning.
The third element, fault, determines legal responsibility,139 and
is central to the Supreme Court’s rulings.140 When the plaintiff is a
public figure or official he or she must prove “actual malice” to
“convincing clarity,”141 a standard falling somewhere between a
“preponderance of evidence”142 and “beyond a reasonable
doubt.”143 Cases involving matters of public concern require
negligence proven by a “preponderance of the evidence.”144 If the
case does not pertain to a public plaintiff or a matter of public
concern, the degree of fault and standard of proof remain issues for
state legislators and courts, with negligence being the most
common standard.145 Since fault remains difficult to prove with
135

See Armenian Assembly of Am., Inc. v. Cafesjian, 597 F. Supp. 2d 128, 137
(D.D.C. 2009).
136
See infra notes 155–168 and accompanying text (discussing the
libel/slander distinction).
137
See Caldor, Inc. v. Bowden, 625 A.2d 959, 970 (Md. 1993) (finding that leading
plaintiff through store in handcuffs qualifies as defamatory).
138
See David L. Aldridge Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 995 F. Supp. 728, 742 (S.D. Tex.
1998) (finding that on-screen messages are capable of a defamatory meaning).
139
Fault is defined as “an error or defect of judgment or of conduct; any deviation from
prudence or duty resulting from inattention, incapacity, perversity, bad faith, or
mismanagement.” Fault, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2017). Fault is a
“traditional element in determining legal responsibility . . . .” in both civil and criminal
cases. Id.
140
See Section I.B.
141
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80, 285–86 (1964); see also supra
Section I.B. for a discussion of the cases elaborating these standards.
142
A “preponderance of the evidence” is defined as “[t]he burden of proof in most civil
trials, in which the jury is instructed to find for the party that, on the whole, has the
stronger evidence, however slight the edge may be.” Preponderance of Evidence,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2017).
143
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 692 F.2d 189, 195 (1st Cir. 1982),
aff’d, 466 U.S. 485 (1984); Yiamouyiannis v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 619 F.2d
932, 940 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980).
144
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 366 (1974).
145
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“fault amounting at
least to negligence on the part of the publisher”). Each jurisdiction sets its own standard.
See SACK, supra note 30, §§ 6:1–6:4.
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regard to defamation,146 and speaks to the extent of a defendant’s
culpability, fault and standards of proof act as an adjustable
balancing point between the competing interests of tort law147 and
society’s interest in free discourse.148
The final element of defamation in the Restatement dictates
that the plaintiff must show that either the defamation is actionable
without proof of “special harm,”149 that is, it is actionable “per
se,”150 or that the publication caused such harm.151 Special harm or
damages often refers only to pecuniary loss,152 but may also
include intangible injury such as psychological or reputational
harm in some jurisdictions.153 Interestingly, the need to prove
special damages acts as a checkpoint rather than a limit on
recovery: once this element is satisfied, plaintiff may recover
special, actual, putative, and unproven presumed damages.154
The distinction between libel and slander155 remains important
at common law because of differences in the need to show “special
146

See McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine, 74 F.3d 1296, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“The
standard of actual malice is a daunting one.”).
147
This balancing includes providing recourse for injury and preventing harmful
behavior, and it speaks to establishing normative standards of conduct. See Blanks v.
Fluor Corp., 450 S.W.3d 308, 373 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765
S.W.2d 42, 176 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)).
148
See SMOLLA, supra note 40, §§ 1:25–1:27.
149
The Restatement (Second) refers to “special damages” as “special harm.” See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); SMOLLA, supra note 40,
§ 7:2.
150
This term often causes confusion, since there exist both libel per se and slander per
se, with each ascribing a different meaning to “per se.” See SACK, supra note 30, §§ 2:8–
2:8.3. As used in this Note, “per se” means that the defamation is actionable without
proving special damages. Id.
151
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558; SMOLLA, supra note 40, §§ 7:1–7:5.
152
See, e.g., Franklin Prescriptions, Inc. v. N.Y. Times Co., 424 F.3d 336, 343 (3d Cir.
2005) (defining “special damages” as monetary or out of pocket losses).
153
Stringer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 151 S.W.3d 781, 793–94 (Ky. 2004), overruled on
other grounds by Toler v. Sud-Chemie, Inc., 458 S.W.3d 276 (Ky. 2014) (including
reputational harm as within “special damages”).
154
SACK, supra note 30, § 2:8. Proving special damages, however, becomes the “rock”
on which many suits “founder.” Id. § 2:8.5. However, in order to obtain presumed or
putative damages in media defendant cases where the statement at issue is about a matter
of public interest, the plaintiff must prove the charge to the “actual malice” standard. See
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 755–56 (1985).
155
Defamation subsumes both of these concepts, with libel being written defamation
and slander being spoken defamation. SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 1:10.
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harm,” as described in the fourth element of the Restatement.156
Libel, traditionally in writing,157 remains a tort with lower
burdens158 on the plaintiff than spoken slander, because the written
word was thought to “leave a more indelible blot” on plaintiff’s
reputation, as well as potentially reaching a larger audience.159 In
essence, a slander plaintiff has the additional burden of
demonstrating “special harm,”160 unless the slander falls into four
“per se” categories, including: 1) imputation of a serious crime
involving moral turpitude; 2) possessing a loathsome disease; 3) an
attack on business, trade or professional competency; and 4) sexual
misconduct or depravity.161 The significance of the libel/slander
distinction has diminished, due to the development of a
constitutional overlay to the common law,162 and definitional
problems associated with the emergence of widespread electronic
and mixed media communications.163

156

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558D.
Courts generally include all forms of “published” defamations in the libel category,
including radio and televised broadcasts. SACK, supra note 30, § 2:3.
158
There is no need to show “special harm” for libel in jurisdictions adopting the
Restatement (Second) position. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569. Other
jurisdictions require a showing of “special damages” for libel where the statement’s
defamatory meaning is libelous only in light of extrinsic facts. See, e.g., Newcombe v.
Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 695 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 45a). In
Newcombe, a California court dismissed a claim brought by a professional athlete and
former alcoholic depicted in a beer advertisement because his former alcoholism was
external to the defamatory material and he had not pled special damages. Id.
159
SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 1:13. The libel/slander distinction dates back to ancient
times. Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 546,
558–73 (1903).
160
Typically, “special harm” required a showing of pecuniary loss and is also referred
to as “special damages” discussed in the fourth element of the Restatement (Second). See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558D; SMOLLA, supra note 40, §§ 7:1–7:5.
161
Id. § 570.
162
Unless “actual malice” is proven, Gertz requires proof of damages “supported by
competent evidence” representing “actual injury” and cannot be presumed or putative
damages in disguise. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349–50 (1974). Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. lifted the restriction for private figure
plaintiffs on matters of private concern. 472 U.S. 749, 757–63 (1985). Effectively, the
Gertz requirement for proving “actual injury” subsumes proving “special damages” in
many cases. SACK, supra note 30, § 2.8.7(A), at 2–149 (noting that this conclusion may
be an oversimplification).
163
SACK, supra note 30, § 2:3.
157
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The basic elements of defamation claims discussed above
provide a useful background for understanding defamation. In
Elias, as in many group defamation claims, the analytic focus
shifts to one element in particular: whether the defamatory
expression was “of and concerning” the plaintiff, discussed in
detail below.164
D. Of and Concerning, the First Amendment, and Group
Defamation
In order to succeed in a litigation, the first element of the
Restatement165 dictates that the plaintiff must successfully show
the defamatory statement was “of and concerning” him or her.166
The rule requires that a nexus exists between the defamatory
material and the plaintiff.167 As such, this element weighs whether
a third party understood that the defamation was about the
plaintiff,168 and in the case of group defamation, whether such an
understanding conceivably leads to harm.169 Because there are
many ways in which a defamatory communication may be vague

164

Elias II, 872 F.3d 97, 104–11 (2d Cir. 2017); see infra Section I.D.
See supra notes 120–32 and accompanying text.
166
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 288–89 (1964); Kirch v. Liberty
Media Corp., 449 F.3d 388, 398 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Julian v. Am. Bus. Consultants,
Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 1, 137 N.E.2d 1 (1956)); SACK, supra note 30, § 2:9; W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., supra note 40, § 113, at 802. Although the “of and concerning” element of libel
claims generally presents a factual question for the jury, a court may dismiss an action for
failure to state a claim, where the statements are incapable of supporting a jury’s finding
that the libel refers to the plaintiff. Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Diaz v. NBC Universal, Inc.,
536 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 337 F. App’x 94 (2d Cir. 2009); Fernicola v.
Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, Inc., 208 N.Y.S.2d 305, 308 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960). But see In re
Houbigant, Inc., 182 B.R. 958 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that “whether the
complaint alleges facts sufficient to demonstrate a connection between the plaintiff and
the alleged libel is a question for the court”) (citing Cardone v. Empire Blue Cross and
Blue Shield, 884 F. Supp. 838, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
167
Fernicola, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 308. This connection, akin to causation in other torts,
assures that the plaintiff and the injurious action are, in fact, related.
168
Kirch, 449 F.3d at 398.
169
In group defamation, only the plaintiff’s group is identified and the link to plaintiff’s
individual reputation arises from his or her membership in the disparaged group. See
infra Part II.
165
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as to the identity of the plaintiff,170 the requirement significantly
limits the eligibility of those who may recover.171
Originally, a publisher did not need to intentionally target the
plaintiff, nor was a showing of negligence necessary.172 To satisfy
the “of and concerning” element, a fact finder only needed to
conclude that the recipient of the defamation correctly, or
mistakenly but reasonably believed173 that the publication referred
to the plaintiff.174 For example, the Washington Post found itself
liable for printing an article about a criminal, because of a local
man’s coincidentally similar name and profession.175 The D.C.
Circuit did not require that the plaintiff, a Washington D.C. lawyer,
prove that the Post acted negligently or with wrongful motive; only
170

For example, it is possible to defame somebody without naming them directly, as
either the circumstances or additional publicly known information makes identification
possible. See, e.g., Doe v. Hagar, 765 F.3d 855, 862 (8th Cir. 2014); Ball v. Taylor, 416
F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 2005). In Elias II, plaintiffs Elias and Fowler were identified in
such a manner. Elias II, 872 F.3d 97, 105–06 (2d Cir. 2017); see infra Section II.E. It is
also possible to defame by imputation, for example, if the defamatory connection is
implied. See SACK, supra note 30, § 2:4.5. On the other hand, vicarious defamation, or
defamation of one’s family, friends, associates, company or other affiliates, generally
does not give rise to liability. See id. § 2:9.5. Group defamation cases exemplify vague
plaintiff identity. See infra Part II.
171
See Kirch, 449 F.3d at 399–400 (finding that the “of and concerning” element of the
tort “stands as a significant limitation on the universe of those who may seek a legal
remedy for communications they think to be false and defamatory and to have
injured them”).
172
“The test is not whom the story intends to name, but who a part of the audience may
reasonably think is named— ‘not who is meant but who is hit.’” Sims v. Kiro, Inc., 580
P.2d 642, 645 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (quoting PAUL ASHLEY, SAY IT SAFELY 30 (3d ed.
1966)); see also Dalbec v. Gentleman’s Companion, Inc., 828 F.2d 921, 925 (2d Cir.
1987); Wash. Post Co. v. Kennedy, 3 F.2d 207, 207–08 (D.C. Cir. 1925).
173
Circumstances dictate whether a communication may be reasonably understood to
be “of and concerning” a plaintiff. Stanton v. Metro Corp., 438 F.3d 119, 128 (1st Cir.
2006). Historically, if a plaintiff was not identified by name, it was necessary to plead the
extrinsic circumstantial facts, called the “colloquium,” that identified her as the defamed
party. SACK, supra note 30, § 2:9.1 n.618 and accompanying text. Such facts are not
necessary at the pleading stage in most modern courts but could be useful in cases of
group defamation. See, e.g., Elias II, 872 F.3d at 104–08 (considering in its decision,
while not called the “colloquium,” evidence of information identifying the plaintiffs not
included in the defamation); SACK, supra note 30, § 2:9.1 n.618.
174
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). It is necessary that
the recipient of the defamatory communication understand it as intended to refer to the
plaintiff. Id. § 564 cmt. a.
175
Kennedy, 3 F.2d at 208.
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that readers understood the article to be about him.176 The standard
requires that some number of recipients, and not the public at
large, understood the defamation was “of and concerning” the
plaintiff.177 The significance of this permissive common law
standard would come under scrutiny in two Supreme Court cases.
In addition to elevating fault requirements for public
officials,178 New York Times brought the “of and concerning”
element into the purview of First Amendment protections.179 Other
courts increasingly recognize the constitutionally gravity of the “of
and concerning” element.180 Commentators agree that “treatment
of the ‘of and concerning’ doctrine, a threshold requirement of the
First Amendment itself, is sound constitutional law.”181 The “of
and concerning” requirement represents a “basic cornerstone”182 of
defamation doctrine, reflecting another checkpoint balancing two
competing interests: protecting reputation from falsehood on one
hand, and freedom of expression on the other.183
The “of and concerning” element’s constitutional aspects
become important to discussions of group defamation problems,
since these seek to resolve whether individual group members
176

Id.
Ultimately, a court must determine that “the libel designates the plaintiff in such a
way as to let those who knew [the plaintiff] understand that he was the person meant. It is
not necessary that all the world should understand the libel.” Dalbec, 828 F.2d at 925
(quoting Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1966)) (internal
citations omitted).
178
See supra Section I.B.
179
New York Times “constitutionalized” the previously unfettered common law tort of
defamation, holding that the First Amendment requires a connection (the “of and
concerning” element) between the defamation and the plaintiff. New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 288–91 (1964) (holding that statements in a defamatory
advertisement were too far removed from Commissioner Sullivan to support that the
statements were “of and concerning” him); see also supra Section I.B.
180
See SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 4:5.50 (citing QSP, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 773
A.2d 906 (Conn. 2001)); see also Art of Living Found. v. Does, No. 10-5022, 2011 WL
2441898, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2011) (“The First Amendment requires a plaintiff to
establish that the statement on which the defamation claim is based is ‘of and concerning’
the plaintiff.”) (citing Blatty v. New York Times Co., 728 P.2d 1177
(Cal. 1986)).
181
SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 4:5.50; see also SACK, supra note 30, § 2:9.1, at 2–155.
182
SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 4:5.50.
183
Fault represents a similar checkpoint established by the Supreme Court. See supra
Section I.B; see also supra notes 139–48 and accompanying text.
177
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satisfy the element.184 In fact, the plaintiff in New York Times was
himself in charge of a group of police, as an elected Commissioner
of the City of Montgomery, Alabama.185 The defamatory
statements never reference the Commissioner by name or title,
asserting only that “truckloads of police armed with shotguns and
tear-gas ringed the . . . [c]ampus,” and that “[police] have bombed
his home almost killing [Dr. Martin Luther King’s] wife and
child.”186 While New York Times never discussed group
defamation explicitly,187 the Supreme Court prohibited the
inferential leap made in the Alabama holding, where the court had
concluded that “in measuring the performance or deficiencies of
groups, praise or criticism is usually attached to the official in
complete control of the [group].”188
In Rosenblatt v. Baer189 the Court again contemplated the “of
and concerning” element and group defamation, confirming their
importance to First Amendment jurisprudence.190 In its decision,
the Court held that jury instructions permitting recovery for libel of
government were constitutionally defective.191 Decided in shortly
after New York Times, the controversy arose when a jury in New
Hampshire awarded damages to a public ski area supervisor, where
a news columnist had imputed that embezzlement and
mismanagement occurred during his tenure.192 The publication did
not name Baer explicitly, but in New Hampshire, recovery was
possible on a group defamation theory provided that “imputation

184

Because each unnamed individual member of a defamed group must satisfy the “of
and concerning element” to pass constitutional and common law muster, this common
law protection has become intertwined with First Amendment protections of speech. See
infra Part II for a discussion of group defamation. Note that if a court holds that the
defamation was “of and concerning” unnamed group members, this holding necessarily
allows all unnamed group members to recover. See Elias II, 872 F.3d 97, 111 (2d Cir.
2017); see also infra Section II.A.
185
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).
186
Id. at 257.
187
It was discussed implicitly, however, since only the unnamed Commissioner and not
individual members of the police brought suit. See id.
188
Id. at 273–76 (emphasis added).
189
383 U.S. 75 (1966).
190
Id. at 75.
191
Id. at 83.
192
Id. at 91.
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of impropriety . . . cast suspicion upon all” group members.193
Brennan wrote that where the defamatory meaning is inferred and
no specific reference to the defendant can be demonstrated, no
recovery is possible.194
The precise impact of Rosenblatt and New York Times on
group defamation claims remains debated but should not be
overlooked. The reach of New York Times with regard to the “of
and concerning” element in the context of group defamation has
been questioned by the First Circuit, particularly where the
plaintiff is not a public official.195 One scholar has suggested that
the decisions essentially reject claims where the defamation
concerns collective group failure, and permits them where the
failure can reasonably be traced to individual failures by, or
blameworthy characteristics of, group members.196 Regardless of
how broadly or narrowly New York Times and Rosenblatt are read,
the “of and concerning” element and group defamation law should
be evaluated with First Amendment protections in mind.197 Both
cases prohibit an inferential leap analogous to an inference that
occurs in some form any time individuals are permitted to recover
when only their group is defamed.198 Therefore, in seeking to
understand and resolve group defamation problems, New York

193

Id. at 77.
Id. at 83.
195
See Emerito Estrada Rivera-Isuzu de P.R., Inc. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc.,
233 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2000) (limiting the applicability of the New York Times’ “of and
concerning” principles to cases brought by public officials on the grounds that the
doctrine was developed to prevent back door actions for seditious libel or defamations of
the government). But see Mich. United Conservation Clubs v. CBS News, 485 F. Supp.
893, 900 (W.D. Mich. 1980), aff’d sub nom. 665 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1981) (indicating that
First Amendment values are relevant to the “of and concerning” element generally).
196
Joseph H. King, Jr., Reference to the Plaintiff Requirement in Defamatory
Statements Directed at Groups, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 343, 351–53 (2000).
197
See Schuster v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 973, 978 (D. Minn.
1978), aff’d, 602 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding that group defamation does in fact
have a constitutional element, and that “[t]o hold that statements commenting generally
on the [] controversy are of and concerning individuals prominent in the controversy
would chill heated public debate . . . .” and would be incompatible with the First
Amendment); see also Church of Scientology Int’l v. Time Warner, 806 F. Supp. 1157,
1160 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
198
See infra Part II.
194
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Times and Rosenblatt call to attention values and reasoning
important to the discussion.
II. GROUP DEFAMATION, TWO POSITIONS AND A RETURN TO ELIAS
V. ROLLING STONE, LLC
When persons within a group199 that has been defamed200 wish
to bring individual claims, difficult questions arise as to whether
the defamatory material is “of and concerning” the aggrieved
parties.201 Part II begins with an introduction and brief history of
group defamation doctrine in Section II.A. A presentation of two
competing group defamation models follows, including the
majority Restatement (Second) position in Section II.B, and the
minority Intensity of Suspicion test in Section II.C. Finally,
Section II.D returns to the Second Circuit’s application of group
defamation rules to Elias and details problems associated with the
current approaches.
A. Group Defamation, Background and History
The group defamation rule202 remains one of the most
intriguing common law protections that plaintiffs must overcome
to meet defamation pleading requirements.203 In general, the rule
requires that “[a]n individual plaintiff must be clearly identifiable
[in the allegedly defamatory statement] to support a claim for
199

A group is defined as “a number of individuals assembled together or having some
unifying
relationship.”
Group,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/group [https://perma.cc/2W8L-562U] (last visited Mar. 5, 2018).
The characteristics of a group play an important role in the legal consequences of
defamation. See infra Sections II.B–C.
200
There are many ways in which a group, as compared to an individual, may be
defamed. If the plaintiff is specifically named, the group defamation doctrine’s
evaluations of group characteristics does not apply and recovery is permitted irrespective
of group traits. Pratt v. Nelson, 164 P.3d 366, 383 (Utah 2007). The group defamation
problem arises whenever defamation concerns the group generally, that is, without
naming specific individuals. Id. In general, racial slurs, insults and epithets against groups
do not support a cause of action. Id. at 381.
201
SACK, supra note 30, §§ 2:9–2:9.1.
202
Generally prohibiting individual recovery for defamation of a group, except for
certain qualified circumstances. See infra Section II.B–C.
203
See generally Nat Stern, The Certainty Principle as Justification for the Group
Defamation Rule, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 951 (2008).
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defamation.”204 When making the assessment as to whether a
member of a group has a cause of action, courts employ tests that
consider several aspects of the circumstances.205 When claims fail
to meet group defamation requirements, the connection between
the defamatory material and the individual is too attenuated to
support a claim, either for practical206 and procedural207 reasons or
because constitutional protections of speech prohibit such
claims.208
The determination as to whether members of a defamed group
may recover individually evolved over time.209 Early American
courts developed group defamation rules while considering aspects
of the situation such as the size of the group and whether
individual members were identifiable.210 A series of cases from the
nineteenth century proposed that no group member, unless
specifically or individually named, would have a cause of action
regardless of group size.211 This approach did not remain in favor,
and several cases in later decades permitted groups composed of
fewer than twenty members to proceed without remarks identifying

204

See Algarin v. Town of Wallkill, 421 F.3d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 288–89 (1964)).
205
See Sections II.B and II.C for a discussion of the Restatement and Intensity of
Suspicion tests; see also SACK, supra note 30, § 2:9.4.
206
For example, when defamatory material alleged that an unidentified individual
policeman out of a department of twenty-one (who each brought suit) locked himself and
a female companion in the back of a police cruiser, the court dismissed the claim. Arcand
v. Evening Call Pub. Co., 567 F.2d 1163, 1164 (1st Cir. 1977) (dismissed on the grounds
that defaming a single unidentified policeperson did not sufficiently impact the reputation
of all twenty-one group members). If dismissal in such cases was not justified, virtually
every complaint of group libel would present a jury issue. Id. at 1165.
207
From a procedural perspective, the cases and controversies component of the
Constitution requires that the plaintiff suffer actual harm related to actions taken by the
defendant. DaimlerChrysler Corp v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 344 (2006); see also Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
208
See supra Section I.B.
209
For a history of English and American group defamation cases see Jeffrey S.
Bromme, Group Defamation: Five Guiding Factors, 64 TEX. L. REV. 591, 598,
602 (1985).
210
Id.
211
See White v. Delavan, 17 Wend. 49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837), rev’d, Ryckman v.
Delavan, 25 Wend. 186 (N.Y. 1840); Sumner v. Buel, 12 Johns. 475 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1815).
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all members.212 Where there was a discussion of group size, it was
often present only to suggest that the group was not too large.213
By the dawn of the twentieth century, the policy behind the
group defamation rule had been well established, with courts
allowing claims to proceed where defamation targeted an
individual, and denying them where statements censured or
satirized “an entire class or body of individuals.”214 In the decades
that followed, discussions increasingly centered around the size of
the group.215 In Service Parking Corp. v. Washington Times Co.216
the court described that the “class [was not] so small . . . as to
cause defamation of it to defame the appellant.”217 In Louisville
Times v. Stivers,218 an appellate court commented that increasing
group size attenuates the connection between the defamation and
the plaintiff.219 These rulings set the groundwork for how modern
courts evaluate group defamation problems.
Among the most illustrative modern cases leading to the
current majority position was Neiman-Marcus v. Lait.220 The
case’s influence stems from a pleasant, reasoned division of groups
based on their sizes.221 A former employee of Neiman Marcus
published a book with defamatory remarks concerning three
distinct groups within the company, each with a different size and
212

See Bromme, supra note 209, at 603.
Courts of the nineteenth century were “not very articulate” in explaining their
reasoning. Id.
214
Weston v. Commercial Advertiser Ass’n, 77 N.E. 660, 661 (N.Y. 1906); Stern,
supra note 203, at 954.
215
Stern, supra note 203, at 954.
216
92 F.2d 502 (D.C. Cir. 1937). In Service Parking, a parking lot owner from
Washington D.C. brought suit following publication of allegations that he had engaged in
a “parking lot racket,” possibly “conducting an illegal business” and “obtaining money
under false pretenses.” Id. at 503. At the time of the article’s publication in the Post, the
complaint stated that twenty or thirty lots (group members) operated in the downtown
neighborhood. Id. This was contrasted with a New York case, where a group of four
coroners were permitted to recover. Id. at 505 (citing Weston, 77 N.E. at 662).
217
Id. at 506.
218
68 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1934).
219
“As the size of the group increases, it becomes more and more difficult for the
plaintiff to show he was the one at whom the article was directed, [until] it becomes
impossible.” Id. at 412.
220
13 F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
221
Id.
213
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specificity of allegation.222 The book identified all of nine models
and most of the 382 saleswomen as “call girls.”223 Further, the
book described most of the store’s twenty-five salesmen as
“fairies.”224 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York described the importance of size, as well as the all/some
distinction, and dismissed only the saleswomen’s claim.225 The
court reasoned that the disparagement only concerned the
saleswomen as a group, rather than as individuals because they
were too numerous to have suffered individual harm.226
Interestingly, the court noted that no legal distinction exists
between the defamation of some salesmen and all models, likely
because the small size of these groups made the difference in the
fraction of the group implicated irrelevant.227 The cases described,
as well as constitutional developments228 influence both of the
modern approaches to group defamation outlined below.
B. Majority, Restatement Position
The Restatement (Second) of Torts lays out the most widely
invoked229 version of the group defamation rule:

222

Id. at 313.
Id.
224
Id.
225
Id. at 316 (citing Service Parking Corp. v. Wash. Times Co., 92 F.2d 502 (D.C. Cir.
1937) (instructing that when groups are large, no one can sue even if the language is
inclusive); see also Latimer v. Chicago Daily News, Inc., 71 N.E.2d 553 (Ill. App. Ct.
1947) (holding that when less than all of the members are defamed, no cause of action
exists); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Skinner, 25 So. 2d 572 (Miss. 1946) (holding that
even when only a number of members are targeted in a group defamation, all may
recover); Weston v. Commercial Advertiser Ass’n, 77 N.E. 660 (N.Y. 1906) (instructing
that where a group is small, and each member is referred to, then any individual member
can recover).
226
Neiman-Marcus, 13 F.R.D. at 317.
227
Id. at n.1 (“[I]t is difficult to perceive a legalistic distinction between the statements
that ‘some Neiman models are call girls’ and ‘most of the sales staff are fairies.’”).
Nevertheless, both the Restatement and the Intensity of Suspicion analyses rely, in part,
on what fraction of the group the defamation implicates. See infra Sections II.B, II.C.
228
See supra, Section I.B.
229
McCullough v. Cities Serv. Co., 676 P.2d 833, 835 (Okla. 1984) (describing the
“majority rule” of the Restatement); see DAVID ELDER, DEFAMATION: A LAWYER’S GUIDE
§ 1:32 (2017). In general, the majority of states do not permit recovery for groups larger
than twenty-five. Id.; see also infra Section II.C. (explaining the minority position).
223
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One who publishes defamatory matter concerning a
group or class of persons is subject to liability to an
individual member of it if, but only if,
the group or class is so small that the matter can
reasonably be understood to refer to the member, or
the circumstances of publication reasonably give
rise to the conclusion that there is particular
reference to the member.230
Courts adopting the majority, Restatement position favor a
presumptive limit of twenty-five group members, above which
recovery is not usually available.231 While group size plays a
prominent role in all formulations of the rule,232 the majority
position’s emphasis on a specific size crystalized following
Prosser’s233 pronouncement that the rule bars recovery “quite
uniformly” where group size exceeds twenty-five persons.234 The
Restatement’s commentary reinforces the numerical guideline,
deeming recovery available for individual members of groups
“number[ing] 25 or fewer.”235 The Restatement leaves unanswered
questions as to how to count group members, tasking the plaintiff

230

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
See O’Brien v. Williamson Daily News, 735 F. Supp. 218, 223–24 (E.D. Ky. 1990),
aff’d, 931 F.2d 893 (6th Cir. 1991); Webb v. Sessions, 531 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1975).
232
See Bujol v. Ward, 00-1393 (La. App. 5 Cir 1/31/01), 778 So. 2d 1175, 1178, writ
denied, 2001-0555 (La. 4/27/01), 791 So. 2d 117 (stating that “most authorities agree”
that the group size shouldn’t exceed twenty-five); Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc. v. Morris, 377
P.2d 42 (Okla. 1962) (rejecting absolute limits on size while adopting the intensity of
suspicion test, which considers size); see also SHELDON W. HALPERN, THE LAW OF
DEFAMATION, PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND “MORAL RIGHTS” 35 (Anderson Pub. Co.
ed.1988) (observing that the “size of the group will determine whether the statement is
defamatory of the individual member”); King, supra note 196, at 394 (asserting that
group size has been the most influential factor affecting group defamation claims and that
it is often outcome determinative); Bromme, supra note 209, at 595 (1985) (suggesting
that most courts rely heavily on size); Note, Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875, 894
(1956) (mentioning that the size of a group is the most important variable in group
defamation claims).
233
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
234
PROSSER’S TORTS, supra note 40, at 750.
235
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. b. The Restatement references the
number “twenty-five” a total of four times in the two pages dedicated to group
defamation. Id. § 564A.
231
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and courts with making the determination.236 In addition to
allowing small group members to recover, the Restatement also
permits recovery where evidence tends to show that the statement
and circumstances identify the individual plaintiff.237
In addition to group size, the Restatement also encourages
courts to consider how many members of the group the defamatory
statement implicates.238 For groups numbering fewer than twentyfive, the commentary to the Restatement suggests that not all group
members need to be named.239 Where fewer than all members are
implicated, the commentary suggests that the proportion of parties
implicated within a group determines the extent of suspicion that
the defamation caused.240 Only statements that generate a high
degree of suspicion, for example those containing language
implicating a majority of the group, permit recovery.241
The Restatement view invites recovery if the defamed group
does not exceed twenty-five in number and where the defamation
applies to a large fraction of the cohort.242 However, the numerical
size and proportion of the group implicated associated with the

236

See id.
See, e.g., Ball v. Taylor, 416 F.3d 915 (8th Cir. 2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 564A cmt. b. The alternative Intensity of Suspicion Test suggests, and the author
of this Note believes, that such identification pulls the plaintiff out of the group
defamation analysis entirely. See infra Part III.
238
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. c.
239
Id.
240
Id. Notice that while the Restatement mentions the “degree of suspicion,” this refers
to the fraction of persons within the small (fewer than twenty-five person) group that the
defamatory material concerns, a concept similar to, but distinct from, the Intensity of
Suspicion test discussed below in Section II.C. Id. (“Even when the statement made does
not purport to include all of the small group or class but only some of them, as in the case
of ‘Some of A’s children are thieves,’ it is still possible for each member of the group to
be defamed by the suspicion attached to him by the accusation. In general, there can be
recovery only if a high degree of suspicion is indicated by the particular statement. Thus,
the assertion that one man out of a group of 25 has stolen an automobile may not
sufficiently defame any member of the group, while the statement that all but one of a
group of 25 are thieves may cast a reflection upon each of them.”)
241
Id.
242
DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, DOBBS’ LAW OF TORTS §
531 (2d ed.) But see ELDER, supra note 229, § 1:32 (2017) (detailing cases where groups
smaller than twenty-five were denied claims).
237
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Restatement position, described as a “strong presumptions,”243 do
not necessarily bar recovery if the group is larger than twenty-five
or if less than a majority is implicated by the statement.244
Nevertheless, jurisdictions adopting the majority position seldom,
if ever, allow plaintiffs to recover for defamation of groups larger
than the twenty-five person limit.245
The majority position has found substantial support from both
courts and commentators. With the exception of New York and
Oklahoma, every state employs some variant of the framework.246
The Restatement position assures that a court can be “certain”247
that the group member has been defamed, a principle arguably
congruent with other aspects of defamation law.248 One article
suggests that the Restatement strikes a functional balance between
“rigid numerical formula[s]” and “unpredictable ad hoc multifactor
approach[es].”249 Another article fully embraces the simplicity of
243

The Restatement qualifies its twenty-five-person guideline by stating that “definite
limits” are not practical. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. b; see also
Stern, supra note 203, at 952.
244
See, e.g., Ball v. Taylor, 416 F.3d 915 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying Iowa law and
describing a case where fifty-eight plaintiffs were allowed to recover, but only because
evidence that connected them to the defamation individually was present); see also
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 242, § 531.
245
The author of this Note, as of April 2018, was unable to find a single definitive
example within jurisdictions adopting the majority Restatement position, where members
of groups larger than twenty-five were permitted to recover. One case, Ball v. Taylor,
applied the Restatement approach and permitted fifty-eight plaintiffs to recover. Ball, 416
F.3d at 917–18. However, each of the plaintiffs in Ball were, in fact, individually named
in a document issued concurrent to the defamation. Id. As such, this would logically take
the case outside of the scope of the group defamation doctrine. See Pratt v. Nelson, 164
P.3d 366, 383 (“When statements explicitly refer to individuals by name . . . a party
cannot rely on the group defamation rule as a defense.”).
246
See infra Section II.C.
247
See Golden N. Airways, Inc. v. Tanana Publ’g Co., 218 F.2d 612, 621–22 (9th Cir.
1954) (elaborating upon what the Ninth Circuit called the “rule of certainty,” that is, that
it must be “certain” that the plaintiff was the person defamed); see also Brewer v. Hearst
Publ’g Co., 185 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1950) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that statements
concerned him individually, “unless the publication can be said with certainty to include
every member of the group”); Stern, supra note 203 (proposing that defamation law calls
for certainty).
248
Stern, supra note 203, at 953.
249
Id. at 969. The author further proposes that the Restatement model would be best
served if it were consciously informed by the “certainty principle” he describes as
pervasive in defamation law: that the law demands certainty as to the falsehood of the
statement, certainty as to the meaning of what was said as fact rather than opinion, and, in
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the numerical guidepost suggested by the Restatement, and
proposes a solution that would bar any claim with groups of more
than twenty-five.250
Nevertheless, several jurisdictions and scholars have called into
question the prevailing model for considering group defamation
claims. A method for addressing the problem employed by New
York251 and Oklahoma,252 called the Intensity of Suspicion test,
presents an alternative focused on evaluating evidentiary factors.253
While group size and fraction implicated are relevant in these
jurisdictions, these are only two of several variables considered,
rather than the predominant criteria.254
C. The Intensity of Suspicion Test
1. Origins of the Intensity of Suspicion Test
A law review note from 1934 (the “note”) first proposed the
Intensity of Suspicion test while discussing the problem of group
defamation.255 The note acknowledges the difficulties presented by
group defamation, specifically that “formulation of definite rules
governing liability seems impossible.”256 The authors rejected

the case of media defendants speaking on matters of public interest, certainty as to their
culpability. Id.
250
King, supra note 196, at 347 (arguing that the proposed solution “would
categorically disallow all claims by individuals to the extent they were based on
statements targeting a group unless the group totaled twenty-five or fewer members”).
251
See Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 445 N.Y.S.2d 786, 792–93 (1981)
(adopting the intensity of suspicion test); see also Elias II, 872 F.3d 97, 107–10 (2017)
(applying Brady).
252
See Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42 (Okla. 1977); see also McCullough
v. Cities Serv. Co., 676 P.2d 833, 835–37 (Okla. 1984) (applying the intensity of
suspicion test and rejecting a claim from statements concerning nearly 20,000
physicians).
253
See infra Section II.B.
254
Id.
255
Note, Liability for Defamation of a Group, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1322, 1325 (1934).
This proposal predates the Restatement (First) of Torts (1938) which also allows group
members to recover if the reader could identify that the individual or the group was
sufficiently small. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 564(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1938). The
Restatement (First) never precisely defines “sufficiently small,” but suggests, in
examples, that the members of a school board and city council could recover. Id.
256
Note, supra note 255, at 1325.
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existing standards prohibiting individual recovery,257 and proposed
an analysis calling for “a purely factual inquiry” as to whether the
plaintiff was actually defamed.258 The note enumerated three
parameters to be considered during the inquiry.259 First, size would
be evaluated260: as the size of the group increases, probability of
recovery would decrease, and vice versa.261 A sufficiently small
group would negate the need for analysis, since reference to the
plaintiff would be “obvious.”262 Second, the analysis weighs
definiteness in the number and composition as well as group
organization.263 A reader would more likely assign the material’s
meaning to an individual belonging to a well-organized group with
relatively static membership and numerosity.264 Finally, the
analysis considers the fraction of the group implicated.265

257

Id. at 1324–25. The note declared that Sumner v. Buel misinterpreted dictum from an
earlier English case, resulting in the general prohibition of recovery for group defamation
in America. Id. at 1332 (citing 12 Jons. 475 (N.Y. 1815)). Courts of the time struggled
with whether to allow individual claims, because readers could infer that the defamatory
statements did not concern some group members. Id. at 1324. The usual test, permitting
recovery only when “special allusion has been made, either directly or as inferable from
extrinsic circumstances,” is purely a legal fiction, “since no member is [actually] singled
out of the group.” Id. The note proposed that the test should be whether the plaintiff was
actually defamed, even when unnamed. Id. at 1323.
258
Id. at 1325 n.20. The note comments that subjective tests, seeking to divine whether
statements identify the persons defamed, were inferior and declining in favor of an
objective test, namely, whether a reasonable man, upon hearing or reading the
publication, would regard the plaintiff as one of those maligned. Id.
259
Id. at 1325–26.
260
Id.
261
Id. at 1325.
262
Id. at 1326 (citing Commercial Tribune Pub. Co. v. Haines, 15 S.W.2d 306 (Ky.
1929); Barron v. Smith, 101 N.W. 1105 (S.D. 1904)). The note’s authors refer to these
two cases when referring to sufficiently small groups: Commercial Tribune concerned the
only two motorcycle policemen in town and Barron concerned two high ranking officials
of a miners’ union. Haines, 15 S.W.2d at 307; Barron at 101 N.W. at 1107–08.
263
Note, supra note 255, at 1326.
264
Id.
265
Id. at 1326–27. The note comments that a cause of action has been “uniformly
denied” where fewer than all members are named “because of uncertainty as to the
identity of the persons at whom the statement is aimed,” and that such a result is unjust
unless “the number accused is so small in proportion to the size of the [group] that the
injury . . . is inconsiderable.” Id. at 1327.
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2. Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Morris: From Note to Practice
In 1962, the Oklahoma Supreme Court considered a football
player’s claim against True Magazine, for an article entitled “The
Pill That Can Kill Sports.”266 The plaintiff was a fullback on the
Oklahoma University football team, and the article alleged that
“substantially all”267 of the sixty to seventy-person team had been
using performance enhancing narcotics.268 The substance turned
out to be peppermint spray, administered to alleviate the athlete’s
dry mouths.269
In determining whether the material defamed the unnamed
player, the Oklahoma court developed and applied the Intensity of
Suspicion test.270 The court rejected absolute numerical limits, or
that size alone should determine the plaintiff’s right to recover.271
The decision considered the implications of the article: that readers
would know of the plaintiff’s team membership due to its
prominence within the community.272 Additionally, the ruling
stressed that the reader, if a fan of sports, would also know the
plaintiff’s identity and necessarily conclude that he used illegal
drugs.273 Importantly, the Oklahoma court distinguished Fawcett
from a prior, unsuccessful group defamation case on the grounds
that the defamation in the True Magazine article imputed that all
members of the group used an illicit substance.274

266

Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42, 51–52 (Okla. 1962).
Cf. Owens v. Clark, 6 P.2d 755 (Okla. 1931) (Distinguish Fawcett from Owens, a
case in which judges made defamatory remarks about only some members of the
Oklahoma Supreme Court).
268
Fawcett, 377 P.2d at 47.
269
Id.
270
Id. at 52 (citing Note, supra note 255, at 1322).
271
Id. at 51 (“[W]e have found no substantial reason why size alone should be
conclusive. We are not inclined to follow such a rule where, as here, the complaining
member of the group is as well-known and identified in connection with the group as was
the plaintiff in this case.”).
272
Id. at 52.
273
Id. (“[T]he average lay reader who was familiar with the team, and its members,
would necessarily believe that the regular players, including the plaintiff, were using an
amphetamine spray as set forth in the article . . . .”).
274
Compare Owens v. Clark, 6 P.2d 755, 755 (Okla. 1931) (finding it not libelous to
defame some members of the Oklahoma Supreme Court), with Fawcett, 377 P.2d at 42
(holding that a statement regarding all members of the football team was sufficient to
267
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Fawcett was met with approval by courts275 and
commentators.276 In Oklahoma, McCullough v. Cities Serv. Co.
applied the Intensity of Suspicion test and found that a defamatory
statement disparaging all of the osteopaths in United States could
not sustain an individual action.277 New York courts later adopted
the Intensity of Suspicion analysis.278 Recently, a Utah court
discussed the Intensity of Suspicion test seen in Fawcett with
approval.279 The court declined to apply it, however, because
individuals within the polygamous cult alleging defamation had
been specifically named by the defendant.280 The Intensity of

defame), and Elias II, 872 F.3d 97, 97 (2d Cir. 2017) (finding that a defamatory article
implicating all members of a fraternity permits individual claims).
275
See McCullough v. Cities Serv. Co., 676 P.2d 833, 836 (Okla. 1984). In
McCullough, an osteopath brought a libel action against defendant company, alleging that
the defendant libeled him and all other osteopaths in the United States by publishing a
statement that medical doctors received better training than osteopaths. Id. The action
was not sustainable, but the court approved the “intensity of suspicion” test in principle
and commented that the “failure in every reported case [in] our attention to announce the
precise numerical dividing line between groups which are ‘too large’ and groups which
are ‘small’ enough to permit a plaintiff to recover, demonstrates the weakness of slavish
reliance upon the general rule which relies upon numbers alone.” Id. See also Grove v.
Morgan, 576 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Okla. 1978). In Grove, plaintiffs were members of a group
of the only two people indicted by a Federal Grand Jury and established that the libel was
of and concerning them by way of the intensity of suspicion test. Id.
276
See L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 10, at 58 (1978) (opining that
Fawcett may become a ‘landmark’ in American defamation law); W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., supra note 40, at 784 (commenting on Intensity of Suspicion favorably); Ellyn
Marcus, Group Defamation and Individual Actions: A New Look at an Old Rule, 71
CALIF. L. REV. 1532 (1983) (noting with approval that the Fawcett court refused to be
bound by the size-oriented test).
277
McCullough, 676 P.2d at 835. The statement in question “does not disparage the
Plaintiff’s standing within his profession or business. It is the Plaintiff’s profession or
business itself which is assailed. In other words, Plaintiff’s standing or reputation as a
D.O. is not impugned by the publication, nor is a group of D.O.’s of which sub-group the
plaintiff is a member impugned.” Id.
278
See infra Section II.B.3.
279
Pratt v. Nelson, 164 P.3d 366, 382 n.114 (Utah 2007). Pratt cites section 546(a) of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts and 50 American Jurisprudence 2d Libel and Slander
§ 349 (2006), comparing these to the Intensity of Suspicion test, with which they
ultimately agree. Id.
280
Pratt, 164 P.3d. at 379 The court explicitly declines to apply the Intensity of
Suspicion test, implying that the analysis would be appropriate in this jurisdiction if
necessary. Id. at 383.
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Suspicion test continues to find favor with scholars and courts
years after its inception.281
3. Brady and Beyond: Importing the Intensity of Suspicion
Test to New York
In 1981, the Supreme Court of New York applied the Intensity
of Suspicion test in Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc.282 In
Brady, the plaintiffs brought suit following printed allegations that
a group of unindicted police officers were complicit or had
knowledge of the corrupt and criminal activities of their accused
colleagues.283 The group of unindicted policemen numbered fiftythree, twenty-seven of whom brought suit.284 Notably, the article in
question defamed all of the unindicted policemen by accusing
them of having participated in the malfeasance of their accused
colleagues.285
The Brady court emphasized that the size of the group should
not govern the group defamation doctrine.286 Invoking Fawcett, the
Brady court proposed that the original Intensity of Suspicion
factors were non-exclusive, and that other aspects of the
circumstances could and should be evaluated.287 Brady concluded
that the small-town police force was sufficiently small,288 well281

See infra Sections II.C.3, II.D.
445 N.Y.S.2d 786, 793 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (adopting the Intensity of Suspicion
test, but deciding to “add[] refinement to the underlying concept” by incorporating the
prominence of the group and the plaintiff within the community).
283
Id. at 787 (The newspaper printed that “[t]he department was in a shambles in 1972
after 18 officers, including Chief Humbert Capelli, were indicted on charges of burglary,
planting of evidence and other misdeeds . . . . We said at the time, and we still believe,
that the entire department was under a cloud. It is inconceivable to us that so much
misconduct could have taken place without the guilty knowledge of the unindicted
members of the department. If so, they all were accessories after the fact, if not before
and during.”)
284
Id.
285
Id.
286
Id. at 791 (“This analysis demonstrates that size is too narrow a focus to determine
the issue of individual application in group defamation.”).
287
Id. at 792–95 (citing Note, supra note 255, at 1325 and Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc. v.
Morris, 377 P.2d 42, 42 (Okla. 1962)).
288
The Brady court compared the size of the fifty-three-man group favorably to the
group of 382 saleswomen and twenty-five salesmen in Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 13 F.R.D.
311 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) and the 600,000,000 Muslims in Mansour v. Fanning, 506 F. Supp.
282
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defined, and prominent within the community to permit the suit to
proceed.289 The fact that individual plaintiffs were also prominent,
having worn police uniforms, further suggested that they would
face elevated suspicion of wrongdoing within the community.290
Adopting the Intensity of Suspicion test, the court concluded that
individual unindicted policemen satisfied the “of and
concerning”291 requirement despite membership in a group larger
than twenty-five.292
A paucity of applications and constitutional problems call into
question the actual success of the Intensity of Suspicion test.
Despite adoption of the Intensity of Suspicion test293 in Brady,
New York courts declined to apply the test to allow recovery prior
to Elias.294 In Three Amigos SJL Rest., Inc. v. CBS News Inc.,295
several subcontractors responsible for managing a New York strip
club brought suit against CBS News for reporting that the club was
run by the mob.296 The court rejected the claim, reasoning that the
Intensity of Suspicion test would apply, but not under the facts as
plead, because the defamation referred only to the establishment
and not to a group of people.297 In Anyanwu, the court applied the
test and found that a claim for statements potentially concerning
186 (N.D. Cal. 1980). Brady, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 791, 794. The court commented that “[w]e
are not the only court to find size limitations unduly restrictive.” Id. at 792.
289
Id. at 793–95. The court also determined that the group of unindicted police were
better defined than the twenty-five salesmen in Neiman-Marcus and the parking lot
owners in Service Parking Corp. Id. at 791.
290
Id. at 794–95.
291
See supra Section I.D.
292
Brady, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 788–95.
293
In Lindor v. Palisades Collection, LLC, a court even applied the test in the context
of a negligence claim, during a duty analysis where a debt collector negligently damaged
a plaintiff’s credit. 914 N.Y.S.2d 867, 868 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
294
Research completed as of April 2018. See, e.g., Three Amigos SJL Rest., Inc. v.
CBS News Inc., 65 N.E.3d 35 (N.Y. 2016); Anyanwu v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 887
F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
295
28 N.Y.3d 82 (2016).
296
Id. at 85 (“Cheetahs advertises exotic women and the . . . federal authorities say it is
run by the mafia.”).
297
Id. at 87 (citing Kirch v. Liberty Media Corp., 449 F.3d 388, 398 (2d Cir. 2006)).
The Three Amigos court noted that defamation claims against businesses do not invoke
the group defamation analysis. Id. This distinction is interesting and seemingly strained,
since businesses would certainly otherwise qualify as exclusive groups and are often
prominent within the community.
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over 500 Nigerian businessmen could not give rise to individual
claims.298
A recent, and important implicit challenge to Brady comes
from Dean v. Dearing, where the Virginia Supreme Court denied a
cause of action for criticism of a small police force on
constitutional grounds.299 The mayor accused the police of
stealing, intimidating witnesses, and harassment, among other
crimes.300 When one of the eight members of the force brought
suit, the Virginia Supreme Court dismissed the claim as protected
criticism of the government.301 Despite these challenges, the
Intensity of Suspicion test provides a flexible analysis free from
the injustice of arbitrary numerical limits imposed by the majority
position.302
D. Analysis of the Existing Methods
First, consider what makes the group defamation problem
difficult in all cases. Defamation claims ask the court to determine
facts of perception about false statements.303 Such perception is
ultimately a subjective enterprise, as our understanding and
appreciation of language varies widely. Just as two readers of the
same poem may come away with different interpretations,304 so
298

Anyanwu, 887 F. Supp. at 693. The plaintiffs brought suit following statements
made during an airing of the television show 60 Minutes describing Nigerian
businessmen as “fraudulent and deceitful” and Nigeria as the “center of fraud in the
world.” Id. at 692. While invoking Brady and the Intensity of Suspicion test, the court
also noted that the “parties have not identified any cases where individual members of
groups larger than sixty have been permitted to go forward.” Id. at 693.
299
561 S.E.2d 686 (Va. 2002). The action concerned statements made by the mayor
accusing unnamed police of “intimidating witnesses, stealing property, harassment,
misappropriation of money, and improperly disposing of drug and gun evidence.” Id.
at 688.
300
Id.
301
Id.
302
See Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 445 N.Y.S.2d 786, 792–93 (N.Y. App. Div.
1981).
303
See supra Sections II.A–C.
304
Robert Frost’s “The Road Not Taken” is famously interpreted by some as
celebrating independent thinking and not following the crowd, when it actually comments
on people finding meaning in arbitrary decisions. Christina Sterbenz, Everyone Totally
Misinterprets Robert Frost’s Most Famous Poem, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 26, 2014, 6:43
PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/frosts-road-not-taken-poem-interpretation-2014-3
[https://perma.cc/CZ8H-SCBU]. “Various quotes from Frost’s correspondence suggest []
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may audiences of a defamatory statement. The problem is
compounded by the potential falsity of the statements, for which
humans have both innate and learned defenses305 that operate with
varying degrees of success.306 Such ambiguity creates a tension
with legal principles of consistency and justice, which are more
readily served by easily categorized facts that fall neatly into
rules.307 Finally, the group dynamic changes the nature of the
damages suffered by the defamed parties, because groups offer
unique protection from emotional harm associated with
defamation.308
The Restatement position appears simultaneously more
restrictive and more permissive than the Intensity of Suspicion
analysis. Courts have interpreted Restatement (Second) of Torts
§564A’s “if . . . the group is so small” to mean generally fewer
than twenty-five.309 This restrictive aspect of the analysis
effectuates a quasi-per-se rule, which prohibits most plaintiffs who
are members of larger groups from recovering individually.310 In
he knew [that] people would misunderstand the meaning,” and even found their
confusion amusing. Id.
305
One example, widely taught in primary education, is critical literacy, which
encourages students to actively analyze texts and other media in a search for the author’s
biases, distortions and hidden meanings. See, e.g., Allan Luke, Critical Literacy:
Foundational Notes, 51(1) THEORY INTO PRACTICE 4, 4–11 (2012).
306
A meta-analysis of police detection of lies found that accuracy varied from eightyeight to forty-five percent across more than thirty published experiments using the same
methodology. Maureen O’Sullivan, Mark G. Frank, Carolyn M. Hurley & Jaspreet
Tiwana, Police Lie Detection Accuracy: The Effect of Lie Scenario, 33 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 530, 531 (2009). These results suggest that the process of truth finding in the face
of deception is complex and inconsistent. Id.
307
See Jay W. Stein, The Hobgoblin Doctrine: Identifying “Foolish” Consistency in the
Law, 29 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1017–21 (1998) (commenting on the virtue and pitfalls of
achieving consistency in the law).
308
The extent to which such protection exists is uncertain, but evidence from studies
suggests persons are better able to cope with stressful events when doing so in a group.
See generally R. J. Corsini & B. Rosenberg, Mechanisms of Group Psychotherapy:
Processes and Dynamics, 51(3) J. OF ABNORMAL AND SOC. PSYCH. 406, 406–11. (1955).
309
See supra Section II.A–B for a discussion of the history and application of the
Restatement position, adopted by a majority of courts.
310
To clarify, a per-se rule would prohibit all individual members of groups larger than
twenty-five, as proposed by King, supra note 196. A quasi-per-se rule as seen embodied
in courts’ application of the Restatement analysis usually prohibits claims for groups
greater than twenty-five, but this bar remains only a “strong presumption.” See supra
notes 242–45 and accompanying text.
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another respect, the Restatement test is more permissive, in that it
provides almost no guidance as to how a court should determine
whether the statement made personal reference to group
members.311 This lack of guidance, save for a few examples in the
comments to the Restatement,312 allows courts wide latitude in
determining how to apply the test.313
The advantages and disadvantages of the Restatement become
apparent when applying and considering the test. The twenty-fiveperson presumptive limit appears arbitrary, not only because the
Restatement provides no rational justification for it,314 but also
because the context of each defamation can vary so widely.315 A
numerical rule of thumb may provide a useful guideline in a
complex area of law, but also implies that courts could dismiss
claims without considering important aspects of the defamation.316
Additionally, the Restatement’s lack of guidance for analyzing the

311

Comment A of The Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) proposes the statement
“‘[a]ll lawyers are shysters’ cannot ordinarily be taken to have personal reference to any
[group member].” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1977). Comment B provides an example where the same statement, uttered at a social
gathering with only one lawyer present is defamatory to an individual lawyer. Id. § 564A
cmt. b.
312
Id.
313
See ELDER, supra note 229 (describing cases where courts applying the Restatement
have disallowed claims for groups that meet the twenty-five-person limit, for example,
because the group was too poorly defined, a justification absent from the Restatement and
its comments).
314
Rules of thumb, that is, rules derived from practice rather than reason, have long
been subject to criticism. Static, precise rules face increasing scrutiny as “[t]he pace of an
industrial civilization, its ongoing regroupings of interest, people, and problem, have
presented new states of fact too rapidly for knowledge to keep up with them.” KARL
LLEWELLYN, THE THEORY OF RULES 79 (1968).
315
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. a, b. Characteristics of the
group, the plaintiff, the defendant, and the defamation itself all impact whether the
defamation of the group reaches the individual. See supra Section II.C; see also Bromme,
supra note 209, at 592–96 (1985) (arguing that many factors influence the holdings in
group defamation).
316
Consider Fawcett, Brady, and Elias where larger groups would not permit such
claims to proceed under the Restatement analysis, yet courts have found otherwise under
the Intensity of Suspicion test.
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context of the defamation lays the groundwork for inconsistent
applications of the rule.317
The Intensity of Suspicion test appears to present a more
practical alternative at first glance. Free from unjustified emphasis
on numerical guidelines,318 the test begins to probe the totality of
circumstances surrounding the defamation in an organized
manner.319 As a practical matter, the availability of the test has not
resulted in a deluge of cases where plaintiffs from large groups
have been permitted to proceed. In fact, only three “large group”320
cases have been documented since the test was first described over
eighty years ago.321 Each of the cases involved a media defendant
with “substantiated” accusations of criminal or unlawful activity
by all or most members of the group.322 The Intensity of Suspicion
test’s adaptability and evidentiary basis provide an appealing
starting point for solving group defamation problems.
The Intensity of Suspicion test’s advantages do not absolve it
of its faults. Constitutional problems loom large.323 The test does
not provide a consistent and rationally satisfactory method for
making the determination.324 In Fawcett, the analysis weighed all
317

The Restatement does not address social circumstances of the defamation, such as
whether the defamatory material played into existing reader bias. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A; see also infra Section III.B.
318
See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
319
The Intensity of Suspicion test explicitly considers group definiteness, prominence
within the community, and individual prominence within the group. See, e.g., Fawcett
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42 (Okla. 1977); see also Section II.C.
320
Cases concerning more than twenty-five group members.
321
See Elias II, 872 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2017); Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 445
N.Y.S.2d 786 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Fawcett, 377 P.2d 42.
322
In Elias II, the Rolling Stone article and related podcast alleged that some members
of a fraternity committed rape, and suggested that all of them were either complicit or had
participated. Elias II, 872 F.3d at 112. The publication in Brady concerned police officers
who were not indicted as part of a corruption investigation, labelling them accessories to
the crimes of their colleagues. 445 N.Y.S.2d at 787. In Fawcett, the article detailed use of
illegal narcotics by members of a football team. 377 P.2d 42. In all cases, the defamatory
material was published as a newspaper or magazine exposé, allegedly as the product of
investigative journalism.
323
The Intensity of Suspicion test developed prior to New York Times and subsequent
decisions. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see supra notes 299–301
and accompanying text.
324
Of the three documented “large group” defamation cases, only the Brady decision
was unanimous. Brady, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 797. In Elias II, the dissent called Brady a “thin
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of the factors except for group size in favor of the plaintiff, but the
ruling left unanswered just how the factors are evaluated relative to
one another, only concluding that the average reader would know
the plaintiff.325 Restrictive aspects of the test prevent courts from
examining the totality of the situation—only the enumerated
parameters are certain to be considered, leaving judges with
somewhat narrowed discretion.326 The test’s reliance on the all or
some distinction for groups of larger sizes327 creates an additional
complication, as illustrated by Elias.328 The question becomes
difficult when a statement only implies that all of the group
members were complicit, without specifically accusing every
member.329
The interdependence of each Intensity of Suspicion element
jeopardizes the objectivity and efficacy of the test. Size is a
frequently debated aspect of the Intensity of Suspicion test,330
likely because the acceptable size of the group depends on other
variables. Generally, the size of the group cannot grow to a point
where the connection between defamation and plaintiff strains
credulity, but courts employing the Intensity of Suspicion test have
only precedent for a guideline.331 The prominence of the individual
reed” and argued that the article could not be read as concerning all of the fraternity
brothers. Elias II, 872 F.3d at 113. The dissent concluded, “It is not at all clear that
[plaintiff’s group defamation] claim can survive even under our lenient plausibility
standard.” Id. at 112. See King, supra note 196 and Bromme supra note 209 for
proposed alternatives.
325
See Fawcett, 377 P.2d at 51–52.
326
While some courts, including Fawcett, have considered aspects of the circumstances
separate from the original three enumerated by note, such as the plaintiff’s prominence
within the community, it is unclear whether these rulings demand such evaluations in
future cases. Id.
327
See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
328
See Elias II, 872 F.3d at 112 (citing Algarin v. Town of Walkill, 421 F.3d 137, 140
(2d Cir. 2005) (distinguishing and rejecting a claim relying on Brady, because the
defamatory statement did not indicate all of the group members)); see infra Section II.E.
for a detailed discussion of this issue.
329
See infra Section II.E.
330
Compare Bromme, supra note 209 (suggesting size alone should not be
determinative), and Marcus, supra note 276, at 1551 (rejecting size constraints of the
group defamation rule), with King, supra note 196 (embracing numerical limits fully).
331
Precedential limits may be just as arbitrary as those set forth in the Restatement. For
example, the difference between a group of fifty persons as seen in Brady and eighty
persons as seen in the original Elias I complaint is not readily apparent. See Elias I, 192
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within the group, the group within the community, and the
notoriety of the individual’s membership all play a role.332 Group
exclusivity and organization also contribute.333 Whether the
statement concerned all, most, or only some of the group members
further relates to whether the consumer of the material would view
the plaintiff in a dim light.334 Defamatory harm can occur in cases
where statements lack complete inclusivity of all members—
allegations of certain egregious acts or knowledge thereof335 may
prejudice the reader against an individual group member, despite
ambiguous language. As group size grows, the fraction of the
group defamed must remain high or total to support a theory of
individual harm from defamation of the group.336 The
interdependence of each of these aspects invites an evaluation of
whether the inferences drawn by the reader are sufficiently strong
to satisfy the “of and concerning” element.337
The Restatement and Intensity of Suspicion approaches share
many common features. Numerical guideline aside, both evaluate
whether the size of the group dilutes the defamatory effect beyond
actionable, individual injury. If a group is so large that “there is no
likelihood that a reader would understand the article to refer to any
particular member of the group,” it is not libelous of individuals.338
In addition, both examine what fraction of the group the
F. Supp. 3d at 394; Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. 445 N.Y.S.2d 786, 788 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1981).
332
See supra notes 230–90 and accompanying text.
333
Exclusive groups support the inference that the defamation concerned a definite set
of individuals. Groups with a tightly knit social structure favor the plaintiff, as this
feature facilitates imputation of the defamatory accusation onto the individual.
334
Elias II, 872 F.3d at 108 (citing Algarin v. Town of Wallkill, 421 F.3d 137, 139–40
(2d Cir. 2005); Brady, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 794–95).
335
Publishers are generally liable for defamation by imputation but proving such to the
“actual malice” standard becomes a difficult proposition. See SACK, supra note 30,
§ 2:4.5.
336
The Intensify of Suspicion balancing process suggests such a tradeoff. See supra
Section II.C. The incorporation of an arbitrary limit, such as the twenty-five-person
Restatement guideline, could be reasonable where any larger group would require the
implication of all group members. See supra Section II.B.
337
See, e.g., Brady, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 794 (balancing a group’s size against its
prominence within the community and whether it was a definite group before the
defamatory statement).
338
Kennedy v. Children’s Serv. Soc’y of Wis., 17 F.3d 980, 983 (7th Cir. 1994);
Golden N. Airways, Inc. v. Tanana Publ’g Co., 218 F.2d 612, 618–20 (9th Cir. 1954).
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defamation reaches: whether the defamation implicates all, most,
or some of the group members also weighs for or against
recovery.339 Restatement jurisdictions have relied on the “group
definiteness” requirement of the Intensity of Suspicion test.340 Both
permit recovery where individual plaintiffs can be identified
through extrinsic information.341 Finally, while the Restatement
position developed after the Supreme Court’s landmark defamation
decisions,342 neither test completely addresses important questions
of First Amendment law.343 Such commonality suggests that the
approaches are not mutually exclusive and could effectively be
merged into a universal standard.
The majority Restatement position and the Intensity of
Suspicion test have desirable characteristics in addition to
substantial shortcomings. The Intensity of Suspicion test provides
flexibility and an evidentiary approach, while delivering
inconsistent and constitutionally troubling results. The Restatement
delivers a degree of consistency at the expense of flexibility and a
reliance on arbitrary numerical guidelines. Application of the
group defamation analysis to real world fact patterns illustrates the
need for clarity with regard to constitutional aspects of the
doctrine, as well as a consistent analytical methodology.
339

For example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a statement concerning some
members of a court was not defamatory. Owens v. Clark, 6 P.3d 755, 760. However, the
same court later found that it was defamatory to implicate all of the members of much
larger football team. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42, 49–50, cert. denied,
376 U.S. 513 (1964).
340
Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. F. Schumacher & Co., 37 F.3d 996, 1015–16 (3d Cir. 1994),
reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Nov. 15, 1994) (rejecting a claim because the group was
poorly defined). Without explicitly mentioning “definiteness,” a Restatement’s example
prohibits claims where a group’s name could apply to many interrelated families.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
341
See Elias II, 872 F.3d 97, 105 (2d Cir. 2017); Pratt v. Nelson, 164 P.3d 366, 383;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A(b).
342
The Intensity of Suspicion test predates constitutional developments. See supra
Section II.C.
343
The authors of the Restatement (Second) would have been aware of developments
through Gertz and indeed incorporated negligence—an element previously unlisted in the
Restatement (First). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558(C); RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1938). Nevertheless, the Restatement (Second) does not
address the defamation of groups differently, other than suggestions as to the definition of
“sufficiently small,” despite the New York Times’ effect on the “of and concerning”
element. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A; see also supra Section I.D.
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E. Elias v. Rolling Stone LLC
Three members of Phi Kappa Psi, George Elias IV (“Elias”),
Ross Fowler (“Fowler”), and Stephen Hadford (“Hadford”) filed
suit on July 29, 2015, claiming that statements in the Article as
well as Erdely’s statements in the Slate podcast defamed them.344
In 2016, the district court dismissed the suit in its entirety, for
failure to state a claim.345 The decision to dismiss the case as a
matter of law rested on two findings: first, that none of the
plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to show that the statements were
“of and concerning” them, and also that the Podcast remarks were
non-actionable opinion.346
The plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit.347 When a trial
court determines that a statement fails to satisfy the requirements
for a defamation action as a matter of law, appellate courts review
the matter de novo.348 Reviews of Rule 12(b)(6) motions349 are
performed by liberally interpreting the complaint, accepting the
pleaded allegations as true, and drawing all inferences in the
plaintiff’s favor.350 For the plaintiffs to succeed, the Second Circuit
would need to find that the plaintiffs meet pleading requirements351

344

Elias II, 872 F.3d at 104 (referencing Elias I, 192 F. Supp. 3d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)).
Plaintiffs voluntarily dropped their claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id.
345
Id.
346
Id.; see also supra Section I.D for a discussion of the “of and concerning” element.
347
Elias II, 872 F.3d 97.
348
See SMOLLA, supra note 40, § 4:38 (citing Jordan v. Kollman, 612 S.E.2d 203, 207
(Va. 2005)).
349
For a detailed overview of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(b)(6), see 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1357 (3d ed. 2018).
350
See Elias II, 872 F.3d at 105 (quoting Chase Grp. All. LLC v. City of N.Y. Dep’t of
Fin., 620 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
351
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (citing
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007))). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a
defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
557 (2007)).
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for the “of and concerning” element352 with or without the
materials contained in the Podcast.353
The Second Circuit applied New York law to the case on
appeal.354 In New York, “[d]efamation is ‘the making of a false
statement which tends to expose the plaintiff to public contempt,
ridicule, aversion or disgrace, or induce an evil opinion of him in
the minds of right-thinking persons, and to deprive him of their
friendly intercourse in society.’”355 To successfully state a claim, a
complaint must allege the unauthorized publication of a false
statement to a third party that causes harm, unless the statement is
actionable without a showing of injury.356 In addition, the plaintiff
must prove that the material was “of and concerning” him or
her.357 The “of and concerning” element, central to Elias, requires
that the plaintiff allege that the defamatory statement was about
him, specifically that a reasonable recipient of the expression
would connect the defamation to the aggrieved party.358

352

See supra Sections I.B, II.C, II.E.
Because the Southern District of New York had found that the Podcast was “nonactionable opinion,” it was not originally considered part of the defamation. Elias II, 872
F.3d at 104 (referencing Elias I, 192 F. Supp. 3d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part, No. 16-2465-CV, 2017 WL 4126956 (2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2017), and aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, and remanded, 872 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2017)). The Second Circuit would
revisit the issue and hold that the Podcast materials could and should be considered in
determining whether all of the fraternity members were defamed, while agreeing that the
Podcast itself was non-actionable speculation and hypothesis. Id. at 109–11.
354
Id. “Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress,
the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state.” Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
355
Elias II, 872 F.3d at 104 (quoting Stepanov v. Dow Jones & Co., 987 N.Y.S.2d 37,
41 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (internal quotations omitted)).
356
Elias II, 872 F.3d at 104; see also supra Section I.C.
357
Elias II, 872 F.3d at 104; see also supra Section I.D.
358
The plaintiff must show “that ‘[t]he reading public acquainted with the parties and
the subject would recognize the plaintiff as a person to whom the statement refers.’”
Elias II, 872 F.3d at 104–05 (quoting Carlucci v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc., 442
N.E.2d 442, 443 (1982)). Whether the plaintiff satisfies this requirement can be resolved
during the pleading stage as a matter of law. Id. at 105 (citing Church of Scientology Int’l
v. Behar, 238 F.3d 168, 173 (2d Cir. 2001). See also Three Amigos SJL Rest., Inc. v.
CBS News Inc., 15 N.Y.S.3d 36, 41 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015), aff’d, 65 N.E.3d 35 (2016)
(citing Springer v. Viking Press, 458 N.E.2d 1256 (N.Y. 1983)); see also SACK, supra
note 30, § 2:9.3.
353
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The plaintiffs, George Elias IV (“Elias”), Ross Fowler
(“Fowler”), and Stephen Hadford (“Hadford”), graduated from the
University of Virginia in 2013.359 All were active fraternity
members during 2012, the timeframe relevant to Jackie’s
accusations.360 The plaintiffs can be distinguished as follows: Elias
lived in the first bedroom at the top of the stairs in the PKP oncampus house,361 Fowler was rush chair for the fraternity, and an
avid swimmer at the university aquatic facility,362 and Hadford
rode his bike on campus after having graduated.363 Each of the
distinguishing characteristics purportedly tied the plaintiffs to the
Article’s story in some way.364
In Elias, the Second Circuit found that the complaint met the
“of and concerning” pleading requirement for two of the plaintiffs
individually: Elias and Fowler.365 The ruling describes the finding
as a “close call,” but that it was plausible a reader familiar with the
plaintiffs would identify each as the subject of the statements.366
For Elias, the court concluded that the events depicted in the
Article were sufficiently detailed and descriptive of his living
circumstances to pass muster.367 The Article implicated Fowler
individually because it described one rapist as a lifeguard, as well
as suggesting that the rape was a part of initiation, which he would
359

Elias II, 872 F.3d at 101.
Id.
361
The location of Elias’ room becomes relevant because the narrative in the Article
describes taking a staircase up to a bedroom without mention of crossing a locked
security door. Id. Only Elias’ room fits such an account. Id.
362
Id. at 102. The “rush chair” oversees the new member recruitment and initiation
process. Id.
363
Hadford’s propensity to ride his bicycle on campus after graduating potentially
linked him to the Article because Jackie reported that one of the rapists fit such a
description. Id. at 107. The Second Circuit would affirm that this connection to the
defamation was too speculative to state that the defamation was “of and concerning”
Hadford individually. Id.
364
See supra notes 361–63 and accompanying text.
365
Elias II, 872 F3d. at 105.
366
Id.
367
Id. at 106. “Considering that Elias was a member of Phi Kappa Psi; he graduated in
2013 (the year that the alleged perpetrators graduated); he lived in the fraternity house in
the only bedroom on the second floor that was both large enough to fit the description of
the alleged location of the rape and easily accessible by non-residents; and he was in fact
identified by others as one of the alleged attackers, Elias has sufficiently pled that the
Article was ‘of and concerning’ him.” Id.
360
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have overseen as rush chair.368 Following publication, both Elias
and Fowler allegedly experienced scorn from peers, co-workers,
and reporters.369 While the Article did describe one of the rapists as
bicycling through campus after graduating, these facts were
“merely consistent” with defendant liability370—to recover, the
court would need to connect Hadford to the statement in another
way.
Group defamation doctrine arose to address the “of and
concerning” element where defamation of a group caused
individual injury, but could not be connected to the individual
specifically, as in the case of Hadford.371 Applying the Intensity of
Suspicion test, the Second Circuit considered group size, the
fraction of the group implicated, and the prominence of both the
group and its members in the community.372 Weighing these
factors,373 the majority found that the Article contained statements
“of and concerning” all of the fraternity members, including
Hadford.374 The complaint alleged that the fraternity contained
fifty-three members during the relevant time period,375 which met

368

Id. at 106. Fowler’s involvement in the fraternity recruitment process would have
placed him in a position to have intimate knowledge of a gang-rape initiation ritual, and
the Article also described one of the rapists as a swimmer.
369
Id. at 105, 107. For example, “Fowler . . . received harassing texts, emails, and
comments from peers, co-workers, and reporters.” Id. at 107.
370
Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007))). Twombly and Iqbal established that pleadings
need to demonstrate more than facts “merely consistent” with liability. See supra
note 351.
371
See supra Part II.
372
Elias II, 872 F.3d at 108 (quoting Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 445 N.Y.S.2d
786, 794–95 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Algarin v. Town of Wallkill, 421 F.3d 137, 139–40
(2d Cir. 2005)).
373
The Elias II court held that each element of the intensity of suspicion test was
satisfied by the circumstances: the size of the fraternity was not prohibitively large, the
defamation concerned all members, and the social circumstances permitted easy
identification of group members within the community. Id. at 107–10.
374
Id. at 110.
375
Interestingly, the number reported in the complaint varies. Sack reports, and the
initial decision mentions, over eighty fraternity members. See SACK, supra note 30, §
2:9.4, at 2–162. This number was later amended to fifty-three. See Elias II, 872 F.3d
at 108.
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New York’s precedential standard.376 The Second Circuit
overturned the district court’s determination that the statement did
“not expressly or impliedly state that the fraternity required all
initiates to participate in a rape, or impute any knowledge of such a
requirement to plaintiffs,” thus failing to satisfy the “of and
concerning” element.377 The majority relied on statements
suggesting that the rape was part of an initiation ritual378 and
testimony from other women who had been raped at the fraternity
as facilitating the inference that the Article accused every group
member.379 At a minimum, the Second Circuit’s holding proposed
that the Article and Podcast described all of the fraternity members
as aware of the sexual violence of their colleagues.380
The dissent in Elias took issue with several aspects of the
ruling.381 While finding that the complaint sufficiently alleged that
the Article was “of and concerning” Elias and Fowler, the dissent
asserts that the majority applied group defamation doctrine and the
Intensity of Suspicion test beyond precedential and rational
limits.382 The dissenting judge emphasized that to rely on Brady,383
the defamatory material would necessarily implicate all of the
fraternity members – a fact that was unclear from the Article and
Podcast.384 In addition, the dissent argued that the fraternity and
member’s prominence in the community failed to satisfy the

376

Brady, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 788. In Brady, members of a fifty-three-person group filed
suit. Id.
377
Elias II, 872 F.3d at 108.
378
Specifically, the Second Circuit relied on quotes from the Article and the Podcast,
such as a fraternity member asking “[d]on’t you want to be a brother?” during the rape, to
mean that the rape was “some kind of initiation ritual.” Id. (quoting the Article and the
Podcast). If gang rape were part of an initiation ritual, these statements would suggest
that all members of the group either performed or were conspirators to gang rape. Id.
379
Id. at 109.
380
Id. at 109–10.
381
Id. at 111. Judge Raymond Lohier dissented from the majority opinion of Forrest
and Cabranes. Id. at 100–11.
382
Id. at 112.
383
Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 445 N.Y.S.2d 786, 792–95 (N.Y. App. Div.
1981) (discussing the intensity of suspicion test). Brady is important to New York
defamation jurisprudence because it represents the court’s first adoption of the intensity
of suspicion test. Id.
384
Elias, 872 F.3d at 112.
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relevant part of the Intensity of Suspicion analysis.385 The dissent
proposed that the appropriate solution, in this context, should have
been to certify the issue to state court,386 so that New York courts
could properly decide an important policy matter.387 The dissent
concluded that the majority and plaintiffs “rely on an interpretation
that is untenable (and yes, implausible) when the statements are
examined in the context of the article.”388
Elias and fallout from the Article’s publication have important
consequences, particularly for news and media organizations.389 In
litigation related to the Article’s release, a district court returned a
verdict awarding another plaintiff, Dean Eramo, $3,000,000 for her
depiction in the Article, although she would later settle for an
undisclosed amount while awaiting appeal.390 In the summer of
2017 the UVA chapter of Phi Kappa Psi reached a settlement with
Rolling Stone and the Article’s author totaling $1,650,000.391

385
The Elias II dissent questioned whether fraternity brothers on a college campus
were, by analogy, as recognizable as members of a police force in a small town, as seen
in Brady. Id. The dissent proceeded to question whether a plaintiff’s prominence within
the community and intimacy of the community would even be considered a part of the
intensity of suspicion test by native New York courts. Id.
386
Certification to state court is the procedure by which a federal court of appeals
defers deciding a novel or difficult question of state law by certifying the question to the
highest court of the state. Certification to State Court, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th
ed. 2017).
387
Elias II, 872 F.3d at 113.
388
Id. at 114.
389
In his dissent, Judge Lohier advised publishers to “beware” until New York courts
have the opportunity to “correct[]” the error. Id. at 112.
390
Eramo v. Rolling Stone, LLC, 209 F. Supp. 3d 862 (W.D. Va. 2016),
reconsideration granted, No. 3:15-CV-00023, 2016 WL 5942328 (W.D. Va. Oct. 11,
2016). Dean Eramo alleged that the article depicted her as a villain, ineffective and
indifferent to the Jackie’s plight following the assault. Id. See also Doreen McCallister,
‘Rolling Stone’ Settles Defamation Case with Former U. Va. Associate Dean, NPR (Apr.
12, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/04/12/523527227/rollingstone-settles-defamation-case-with-former-u-va-associate-dean [https://perma.cc/J86PUPZY].
391
T. Rees Shapiro, Fraternity Chapter at U-Va. To Settle Suit Against Rolling Stone
for $1.65 Million, WASH. POST (June 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local
/education/fraternity-chapter-at-u-va-to-settle-suit-against-rolling-stone-for-165million/2017/06/13/35012b46-503d-11e7-91eb9611861a988f_story.html?utm_term=.b1fcbcb00ae3 [https://perma.cc/968F-64VH].
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Rolling Stone settled with the fraternity member plaintiffs for an
undisclosed amount in the final months of 2017.392
Elias highlights an important area of law, not only because of
financial considerations for publishers and the standards to which
defamation cases are decided, but also for First Amendment issues
generally.393 The Article’s coverage of sexual abuse and the culture
surrounding it places it at the forefront of discussions important to
public interest. In addition, a group’s unique position of power
calls to attention whether unnamed, anonymous plaintiffs should
be permitted to recover as private persons. Finally, the Second
Circuit’s decision highlights challenges presented by the
application of group defamation doctrine. Had Elias been decided
in a majority Restatement jurisdiction, it is very unlikely that
Hadford could recover.394 Issues and inconsistencies arising from
group defamation support the notion that defamation law fails to
achieve efficient results or establish reliable protections of speech
and reputation.
III. GROUP DEFAMATION, POWER AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Defamation law seeks to strike a balance between the
protection of reputation on one hand, and freedom of expression on
the other.395 The group defamation doctrine stands to benefit from
the development of an analysis devised with First Amendment
values in mind. Further, existing methods for determining whether
group members may recover contain arbitrary obstacles, fail to
392

Eriq Gardner, Rolling Stone Settles Last Remaining Lawsuit Over UVA Rape Story,
HOLLYWOODREPORTER.COM (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thresq/rolling-stone-settles-last-remaining-lawsuit-uva-rape-story-1069880
[https://perma.cc/BYT7-S5JE].
393
See Section I.B, supra note 33.
394
Because the group exceeded the presumptive limit of twenty-five members, Hadford
would be disqualified from Restatement (Second) § 564A’s exception (a), where the
“group or class is so small that the matter can reasonably understood to refer to the
member.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1977). Similarly,
Hadford did not meet the standard set by Restatement (Second) § 564A(b), where
“circumstances of publication reasonably give rise to the conclusion that there is
particular reference to the member.” Id. § 564A(b); see also supra Section II.B.
395
See supra, Section I.B.; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
325 (1974).
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account for important considerations, and are inconsistently
applied across and occasionally within jurisdictions.396 Part III of
this Note proposes a methodology (“the Test”) addressing these
issues. Section III.A considers the constitutional underpinnings of
modern group defamation doctrine and proposes that the power of
the defamed should inform the standard, as described in part one of
the Test. Section III.B introduces part two of the Test, a flexible
standard based on existing methodologies. Section III.C returns to
Elias and applies the proposed standards. Finally, Section III.D
comments on the proposed Test.
A. Test Part One: Constitutional Law, Power and the Standard
for Individual Group Members
Lessons from First Amendment jurisprudence should inform
discussions of group defamation, because of the “of and
concerning” element’s close ties to constitutional law,397 and
because speech about groups presents unique issues.398 First
Amendment protections developed by the Supreme Court address
society’s need for free and open discussion in particularly sensitive
areas: defamation law disfavors the use of civil suits to silence
discussion of public officials, public figures, and matters of public
concern.399 These areas of especially protected speech reflect the
spirit of the First Amendment and American values.400 Such
396

See supra, Section II.C–D.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 291 (1964). In its discussion of the
Alabama court’s error, the Supreme Court found it unacceptable that the court’s
reasoning “would sidestep this obstacle by transmuting criticism of [a] government
[group], however impersonal it may seem on its face, into personal criticism, and hence
potential libel, of the officials of whom the government is composed.” Id. at 292.
398
See supra Section III.A.
399
See supra Section I.C.
400
See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927), overruled in part
by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (“Those who won our independence
believed that the final end of the state was to make men free to develop their faculties,
and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They
valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to the secret of
happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of
political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with
them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of
noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public
397
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protections permit vigorous discussion of powerful persons and
entities, which, at least in theory, acts as a check on corrupt,
ethically unsound, or illegal actions.401
To inform an analysis for group defamation, consider the
Supreme Court’s rulings protecting speech against the powerful. In
New York Times, the Court found restrictions on speech concerning
the government itself illegal,402 and severely limited the ability of
government officials to sue for defamation.403 Rosenblatt affirmed
these aspects of the holding, in particular that speech that merely
imputes wrongdoing to anonymous government officials should be
protected, and where speech is directed at specific office-holders,
“actual malice” must be proven.404
Extending protections beyond statements about the
government, the Gertz court described two reasons why the law
denies public figures and officials the same protection from
defamation as private citizens.405 These include the ability of such

discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government.”).
401
Id. The constitutional protections for speech and press were fashioned to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for bringing about political and social changes desired by
the people. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269.
402
Justice Brennan’s opinion described the Sedition Act of 1798, which prohibited
criticism of the government, as unconstitutional under the First Amendment: “For good
reason, ‘no court of last resort in this country has ever held, or even suggested, that
prosecutions for libel on government have any place in the American system of
jurisprudence.’” Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 291–92 (quoting City of Chicago v. Tribune Co.,
139 N.E. 86, 88 (Ill. App. Ct. 1923)).
403
Id. at 279–80. In Garrison v. Louisiana, the Court broadly defined the scope of
protected comment on public officials as including commentary that speaks to
dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motive, which may also affect the official’s private
character. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964) (“Manifestly a candidate must
surrender to public scrutiny and discussion so much of his private character as affects his
fitness for office, and the liberal rule requires no more.” (quoting Coleman v.
MacLennan, 98 P. 281, 291 (Kan. 1908))). Quoting Madison, the New York Times
opinion proposed that the Constitution created the American government such that “‘[t]he
people, not the government, possess the absolute sovereignty.’ The structure of the
government dispersed power in reflection of the people’s distrust of concentrated power,
and of power itself at all levels.” Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 274 (quoting 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES
ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 569–70 (1876)).
404
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 77, 82–84, 86 (1966).
405
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
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parties to defend themselves from defamation406 and the
assumption of risk.407 Such abilities stem from public persons’
access to power and resources.408 As such, the Supreme Court’s
restrictions on defamation require careful examination of the
person or entity defamed.409
Groups possess characteristics similar to those of public
officials or public figures, and often involve themselves in matters
of public concern. Many groups possess resources similar or
greater than those of individual public figures or public officials,
making them capable of defending themselves from harmful, false
statements.410 For example, Rolling Stone’s Article faced nearly
immediate censure from investigations by media and the police,
406

Id. (“The first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help—using available
opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and thereby to minimize its adverse
impact on reputation. Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly
greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic
opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy.”). In
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., an opinion delivered prior to Gertz, Brennan disagreed
with the “access to self-help” reasoning, stating that it was “unproved[] and highly
improbable” that public persons possess a superior ability to respond to falsehoods—he
would extend protection to all statement of public interest irrespective of the nature of the
plaintiff. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46–47 (1971), abrogated by
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). For criticism of the “access to media”
argument, see Clawson v. Longview Publ’g Co., 589 P.2d 1223, 1226 (Wash. 1979).
407
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (“[Speakers] are entitled to act on the assumption that public
officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of
injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them. No such assumption is justified with
respect to a private individual.”). Again, prior to Gertz, Brennan’s opinion in Rosenbloom
made the argument that “assumption of risk” “bears little relationship either to the values
protected by the First Amendment or to the nature of our society . . . .” Rosenbloom, 403
U.S. at 47–48.
408
The very definition of the two types of public figures in Gertz speaks to the power of
the defamed party: universal public figures are those who “occupy positions of such
persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes,” and
vortex or limited purpose public figures who “have thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.”
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 351.
409
See supra Section I.C–D.
410
Notice that the Rolling Stone Article prompted a robust defense from individuals in
the group, as well as the national fraternity itself. See supra Introduction, Section II.E.
Groups in other cases, such as the football players in Fawcett and the police department
in Brady had considerable resources at their disposal. See generally Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc.
v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42; Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 445 N.Y.S.2d 786 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1981).
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likely with encouragement from offended group members.411 In the
same way that public persons assume risk, joining a group could
easily pass for assuming the risk that some of the group’s
reputation may be imputed to the individual.412 While it might be
unfair to burden all group members with risk created by the
activities of other group members, individuals usually investigate
and weigh such risk when joining a group, and are otherwise free
to leave if they feel membership could jeopardize their standing in
the community.413
Groups possess powers beyond those of public persons that
both reduce the risk of individual harm from false statements and
make speech about them pertinent to protected public discourse.414
Group defamation doctrine directly addresses the passive,
anonymizing effect of increasing group size.415 Importantly,
groups may actively or passively act to obscure bad behavior, as
well as the identity of bad actors themselves.416 One example of
active obfuscation from American politics includes the concept of
engineering plausible deniability for group members. 417 In fact,
411

See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.
Cf. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
413
Id.
414
Defamation doctrine generally seeks to balance the interests of the individual with
the interests of the public at large. Id. at 341–42 (“Some tension necessarily exists
between the need for a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate interest in
redressing wrongful injury.”).
415
See supra notes 232–37, 261 and accompanying text.
416
Take for example the concept of “omerta,” known widely as the Mafia’s oath of
silence and non-cooperation with authorities. See Henry Biggs & Pietro
Festorazzi, Fuhgeddaboudit: Trying Times for Trying the Mafia Under RICO and 416bis, 42 N.C. J. INT’L L. 823, 825, 842 (2017). Another relevant example includes the
cover-up of sexual abuse by clergy. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, The Waterloo for the
So-Called Church Autonomy Theory: Widespread Clergy Abuse and Institutional CoverUp, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 225, 227–28 (2007) (“[W]hat does distinguish the religious
institutions is a pattern of covering up child abuse, which includes (1) not going to
authorities when abuse is reported to the institution; (2) imposing secrecy requirements
on clergy and victims; (3) shifting perpetrators throughout the religious organization,
both geographically and by specific house of worship; (4) asking law enforcement and
newspapers to look the other way when they learn of individual cases; and, most
important for this essay, (5) insisting on autonomy from the tort and criminal law for the
organization’s role in the furtherance of the abuse.”).
417
This term emerged in the 1970s, where political or paramilitary operatives would
deliberately exclude certain persons from knowledge or connection to questionable
412
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the very issue that Rolling Stone’s discredited Article attempted to
address pertained to cultural and institutional indifference to the
needs of campus rape victims—a phenomenon which ostensibly
exists because of collective behavior motivated by a shared interest
in suppressing unpleasant realities.418
Groups often act in a capacity that would expose an individual
to constitutionally elevated419 standards for defamation claims,
even if none of the group members harmed by the defamation
behaved in such a manner. In addition, groups are in a unique
position of power in our society and are often involved in matters
of public interest. This Note proposes that the group defamation
analysis should consider whether the relevant group possessed and
wielded power in such a capacity. If so, individuals bringing
claims stemming from group defamation should be held to the
appropriate, elevated standard without regard to individual
characteristics. This follows from the notion that if individuals are
permitted to recover from a defamation directly addressing only
the plaintiff’s group,420 they should be held to the standard that the
group would be, if it were acting as an individual.
1. Elevated Requirements for Groups of Public Officials
With the goal of protecting speech critical of power in line with
constitutional principles, the first part of the Test would proceed as
follows: Recovery for group defamation claims brought by
members of governmental organizations would not be permitted.421
This stems from the idea that criticism of groups of government
officials is effectively criticism of the government, an offense for
which there should be no criminal or civil penalty in American
law.422 Where the identity of the public official plaintiff could be
activity such as assassination plots, with the goal that the activity would ultimately be
non-attributable. See S. REP. NO. 94–465, at 11 (1975).
418
See supra notes 2–15, and infra notes 491–92 and accompanying text.
419
See supra Section I.B. “Constitutionally elevated” means that the plaintiff must
satisfy the “actual malice” standard as described in New York Times and the discussion in
Section I.B.
420
See supra Sections II.A–C.
421
Declaratory and injunctive relief could remain available, as well as recovery of
litigation costs. This would permit governmental organizations recourse for false
statements without significantly impeding the free exchange of ideas.
422
See supra notes 382–403.
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deduced by a recipient of the publication, but some degree of
uncertainty remains, the Test’s rule would favor the presumption
that the defamatory material is inactionable speech about
government.423 Where a public official plaintiff is named
directly,424 the New York Times standard would apply as usual. In
addition, putative and unproven damages without proof of “actual
harm” would be prohibited. Public officials “must surrender to
public scrutiny” any and all aspects of their character as relates to
their fitness.425 In the rare case that the speech is immaterial to the
plaintiff’s fitness for office, the Test would permit all types of
recovery after the public official meets the “actual malice”
standard.
2. Elevated Requirements for Private Individuals in Powerful
Groups
The Test would then evaluate whether private individual
members of a defamed group warrant the application of elevated
protections.426 The Test would not apply in cases where the
individual identity of private members may be readily deduced,
inferred, or determined through publicly available information. 427
Such cases render the Test unnecessary, since the legal fiction or
inferential leap demanded by group defamation analysis is not
needed to connect the statement to the plaintiff.428 Thus, the Test’s

423

Such a policy is consistent with prohibitions on claims stemming from criticism of
the government as espoused by New York Times and elsewhere. See supra notes 51–69,
244–54, 402–03 and accompanying text; see also Dean v. Dearing, 561 S.E.2d 686, 688–
89 (Va. 2002).
424
To be named directly, the plaintiff would need to show that the defamation
unambiguously identifies him or her.
425
See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964).
426
Individuals with public figure status already face elevated requirements, obviating
the need for the analysis. See supra Section I.B.
427
In jurisdictions applying the Restatement, this would cover persons exempt from the
prohibition on group defamation under Restatement (Second) § 564A(b). RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A(b) (AM. L. INST. 1977). In jurisdictions applying the intensity
of suspicion approach taken by the Elias court, such persons already fall outside the
scope of the group defamation doctrine. See Elias II, 872 F.3d 97, 106–07 (2d Cir. 2017).
428
The “legal fiction” behind all group defamation claims is that the defamation of the
group constitutes a defamation of the individual. Put differently, a statement “of and
concerning” a group will also concern the plaintiff individually. See supra Section I.C.
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analysis continues only where plaintiffs are unidentified, private
figure individual members.429
To impose elevated requirements on private individuals, the
Test requires that the group qualify as a voluntary public group by
satisfying three criteria. The first considers whether the group
exhibits prominence within the community, as considered by the
Intensity of Suspicion test.430 Further, whether to impose elevated
standards for unnamed group members would rest on two
additional considerations derived from Gertz and subsequent
cases.431 The second evaluates whether the group possesses the
resources to refute the statement,432 and the third asks whether
membership was a voluntary endeavor.433 The satisfaction of all
three criteria indicates that the group has achieved a status within
the community akin to that of public persons, and that the member
has assumed the risk of reputational harm inherent to membership
in a powerful group. Voluntary, anonymous members of public
groups proceeding on a group defamation theory would be
required to satisfy the “actual malice” standard and would not be
permitted to recover putative or unproven damages without a
showing of “actual harm.”
B. Test Part Two: Bias and the Perception of Truth as an
Extension of Existing Methods
While both the Restatement and Intensity of Suspicion test
provide good starting points for the second part of the Test, they
leave much to be desired.434 The manner in which a third party435

429
Group members who qualify as public persons already face elevated fault
requirements when the defamation relates to a matter of public concern. See supra notes
65–90 and accompanying text.
430
See supra Section II.C.
431
See supra Section I.B.
432
Group size, degree of organization, and access to media all speak to such an ability.
433
This requirement is congruent to the “assumption of risk” reasoning described
in Gertz.
434
See Part II. The diversity of views presented elsewhere is illustrative. See, e.g., Stern
supra note 203 (admiring the Restatement position, with a strong presumptive group size
limit of twenty-five); Bromme, supra note 209 (suggesting five guiding social factors that
exclude group size entirely); King, supra note 196 (recommending that courts view the
group size an absolute bar at twenty-five persons).
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evaluates defamatory material about a group involves a process
more complex than current methods envision. In the context of
group defamation, the “of and concerning” element depends upon
more than whether the statement was about the plaintiff.436 The
determination involves measuring the strengths and weaknesses of
an inference, or series of inferences, that the reader must make
connecting plaintiff to the derogatory imputation.437 The strength
of these connections determines whether the material causes the
reader to pass harmful judgement upon the plaintiff.
The reader makes her inferences under the influence of an
array of variables, making the analysis resistant to simplification.
Such variables may include considerations as nebulous as social
context, semantics, and how the individual perceived the statement
in question. Thus, group defamation doctrine already requires438
that the court enter into analysis akin to factfinder’s evaluation of
third-party perceptions.439 For these reasons, it is not unreasonable

435

Meaning the third party that receives the defamatory material. The material need
only be understood to mean the plaintiff by one person outside of the defendant and
plaintiff. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
436
If all statements “of” or “about” the plaintiff qualified for a claim, the group
defamation rule would seldom prevent litigation. The statement must “concern” the
plaintiff, “concern” being defined as “[r]elate to; [be] connect[ed] with; [be of] interest or
importan[ce] to; affect.” Concern, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2017).
This, as well as the theories behind the group defamation rule, suggests that the statement
must have some deeper connection with the plaintiff. See supra Part II.
437
See supra, Part II.
438
For example, the intensity of suspicion test asks judges to determine whether the
defamation names all members of a group, explicitly or by implication, as well as to
make judgments about subjective aspects of the group, such as definiteness and
prominence within the community. See supra Section II.C.
439
The third party means receiver of the defamatory communication.
The distinction between ‘law’ and ‘fact’ has proved obscure
wherever it is employed. For instance, the common law used to
require that a plaintiff’s complaint in a civil action only state the
‘facts’ of his case, not any ‘legal conclusions.’ Unfortunately, no one
has ever been able to tell whether the allegation that ‘on November 9,
the defendant negligently ran over the plaintiff with his car at the
intersection of State Street and Chestnut Street’ is a statement of fact
or a legal conclusion. In fact, the distinction between law and fact is
just the legal version of the philosophical distinction between
‘empirical’ and ‘analytical’ statements, a distinction on whose
existence philosophers have been unable to agree to this day . . . .
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to extend the scope of the group defamation Test beyond
characteristics of the group and the fraction of group members
implicated, as described below.440
After determining the appropriate standards of fault in part one
of the Test,441 the second phase considers how a statement about a
group moves from perception to individual harm. The proposed
Test relies on a balancing of the elements described in the Intensity
of Suspicion test,442 with the addition of a fourth element
considering biases. To satisfy the novel element of the Test, the
defamation must be both believable and severe, overcoming
resistance to prejudice against the individual. To score the new
Test, most of the original elements described in the Intensity of
Suspicion test must favor the plaintiff.443 If the analysis is
equivocal,444 the Test’s novel fourth element decides the matter.
1. Believability of the Defamatory Material
When considering a defamatory expression about a group, the
reader or listener first decides whether to believe the statement at
all. The defamer presents purported facts about a group, which
may or may not be true as to its members. If the material is
unbelievable entirely, then the defamatory harm to reputation is
significantly attenuated, even if the statement could be interpreted
as about the person.445 Part of this determination normally occurs
elsewhere: Defamation law prohibits claims for statements of
LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS: CONUNDRUMS OF CRIMINAL LAW 276–93
(Univ. of Chi. Press, 1987).
440
See supra Section III.B.
441
See supra Section III.A; see generally supra Section I.B.
442
The flexible criteria of the Intensity of Suspicion test are sufficiently compatible
with the Restatement, excluding the presumptive twenty-five-person limit. See supra
Section II.D.
443
See supra Section II.C.
444
Because the original intensity of suspicion elements are not independent and require
a degree of judicial discretion, such a result can be expected. See supra Section II.D.
445
This concept is critical to group defamation theory. See supra Section II.
Reputational harm entails a shift in a reader’s perception so as to lower the defamed
person’s social or professional standing. Whether or not the statement is believable does
not affect emotional distress caused by the defamation, an effect which the author of this
Note believes is not a priority in cases of group defamation. See supra Section I.A.
Individuals are well protected from emotional harm because of the nature of the group
and the group itself. See supra Section II.D.
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opinion, insults, etc., because these statements do not assert
provable facts.446 The listener is expected to view such expression
with a degree of incredulity, and such statements are rejected as a
matter of law.447
In group context, the Test benefits from incorporating an
estimate of how likely the statement is to be believed by a
reasonable third party.448 This is akin to determination of whether
the statement is presented as a matter of fact or a matter of opinion,
in that context and form are both relevant.449 The evaluation
considers facts about the circumstances and the statement itself, to
aid in the prediction of whether the defamatory material actually
reaches or concerns the plaintiff. This component of the Test
ensures that the reputational harm is real in the face of the
protective insulation the plaintiff receives by virtue of being an
unnamed group member, especially where the Test’s other
elements may be equivocal.
The perceived likelihood of belief can be expressed as a
fraction or percentage of the likelihood a consumer would believe
the statement. If it is more likely than not that a reasonable person
would believe the statement, the Test’s believability element is
satisfied. The determination considers several aspects of the
situation including source trustworthiness, the plausibility of what
has been asserted, and the propensity for confirmation bias.
a) Source Trustworthiness
Source trustworthiness weighs existing sentiment towards the
conveyor of the statement. Source credibility theory450 provides
446

“Common-law tradition has combined with constitutional principles to clothe the use
of epithets, insults, name-calling, and hyperbole with virtually impenetrable legal armor,
at least insofar as a resulting defamation suit is concerned.” See SACK, supra note 30, §
2.4:7; Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50, 52 (1988).
447
See supra notes 122, 353.
448
This would be the “believability element” of the Test. The reasonable third party is
used interchangeably with the consumer, reader, or recipient of the defamatory
expression. See SACK, supra note 30, § 2.43 (explaining the legal nuances of defamatory
recipients).
449
See supra note 446.
450
See David K. Berlo James B. Lemert & Robert J. Mertz, Dimensions for Evaluating
the Acceptability of Message Sources, 33 PUB. OPINION Q. 4, 563–76 (1969); Carl I.
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insight into making the determination for media defendants.451
Specifically, media credibility refers to the perceived believability
of media content, beyond any proof of its contentions.452 Empirical
studies have validated scales for rating the credibility of media
outlets,453 demonstrating that the source of information reliably
effects the degree to which outlets are trusted. For non-media
defendants, a parallel process would consider the speaker’s
perceived authority on the matter, as well as her prejudices,
ambitions, and experience.454 For relatively unknown defendants,
the Test would simply consider the content and context of the
statement, described below.455
b) Plausibility of the Statement
The plausibility sub-component evaluates whether a consumer
perceives the defamation as likely to be true, regardless of the
source. Such a determination requires an examination of the
statement as well as the circumstances of its creation. Statements
made following an investigation, supported by witness accounts, or
corroborated by facts and observations are more likely to be
perceived as true.456 Statements containing obvious signs of bias,
Hovland & Walter Weiss, The Influence of Source Credibility on Communication
Effectiveness, 15 PUB. OPINION Q. 4, 635 (1951).
451
Source credibility theory draws on themes of persuasion dating to Aristotle, who
divined three persuasive audience appeals: logos, pathos, and ethos. Hovalnd & Weiss,
supra note 450, at 635. Ethos, meaning character, is linked to credibility as it is presented
to inspire trust in the audience. Kate Ronald, A Reexamination of Personal and Public
Discourse in Classical Rhetoric, 9 RHETORIC REV. 36, 39 (1990).
452
Mark D. West, Validating a Scale for the Measurement of Credibility: A Covariance
Structure Modeling Approach, 71 JOURNALISM Q. 159 (1994).
453
See Cecilie Graziano & Kristin McGrath, Measuring the Concept of Credibility, 63
JOURNALISM Q. 451, 451–62 (1986) (describing a scale for rating media credibility); see
also Philip Meyer, Defining and Measuring Credibility of Newspapers: Developing an
Index, 65 JOURNALISM Q. 567, 567–74 (1988) (testing and validating the metrics
developed by Graziano and McGrath).
454
For example, a person’s status as an insider or subject matter expert tends to bolster
their credibility in the consumer’s eyes.
455
An “unknown” defendant, for purposes of the Test, is simply one without a
reputation for trustworthiness or otherwise.
456
This phenomenon is driven by evidence presented by the defamation to the
consumer of the defamation. Evidence is defined as “the means from which an inference
may logically be drawn as to the existence of a fact . . . the demonstration of a fact . . . .”
Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2017).
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made thoughtlessly, or based on speculative reasoning evidence a
lower likelihood of perceived truth.457
c) Confirmation Bias458
The Test’s analysis speaks to the reader’s ability and
willingness to make the necessary, harmful inferences about the
individual from what she perceives about a group. Importantly,
these inferences must overcome the third party’s unwillingness to
be prejudiced against the individual based on group
characterizations.459 The group defamation problem hinges on a
determination that a third party undertakes under uncertainty. Most
or many consumers of a statement would give even a known group
member some degree of the benefit of the doubt, or at a minimum
hesitate to prejudice a member based on statements concerning
anonymous fellow group members. Nevertheless, aspects of the
defamation and circumstances could overcome such resistance,
resulting in defamatory harm to the individual. If a high degree of
suspicion already surrounds the group, the reader is more likely to
accept the defamation as true.460 The Test considers aspects of the
group, the defamation, and the social circumstances to make the
determination.461
457

This assertion stems from the fact that such statements suggest a lack of evidence.
See supra note 456. Where statements drift closer to speculation, as the Elias court found
with regard to Erdely’s statements in the Podcast, the likelihood of defamatory impact is
reduced. See Elias II, 872 F.3d 97, 110 (2d Cir. 2017).
458
See generally SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING
(1993). Confirmation bias is the tendency to interpret information in a way that confirms
one’s preexisting beliefs or hypotheses. Id. As Benjamin Cardozo once explained, “We
may try to see things as objectively as we please. Nonetheless, we can never see them
with any eyes except our own.” Id.
459
See infra Section III.B.3.
460
See Kathleen Nalty, Strategies for Confronting Unconscious Bias, 45 Colo. Law. 45,
45–46 (2016); see also Barbara O’Brien, Prime Suspect: An Examination of Factors That
Aggravate and Counteract Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations, 15 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 315, 324–25 (2009) (discussing the results of a psychological study on
the impact of confirmation bias during investigations).
461
Questions of whether, and to what extent, the defendant’s statement harmed the
plaintiff are questions for the jury, but the Test provides a flexible framework based on
existing standards for resolving the “of and concerning” element. See SMOLLA, supra note
40, § 9:56 (2d ed. 2017) (“[T]he question of whether a plaintiff’s damages were caused
by the defamatory statement is for the jury to decide . . . .” (quoting Cockram v. Genesco,
Inc., 680 F.3d 1046, 1051 (8th Cir. 2012))).
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2. Severity of the Defamatory Material
The gravity and individual reach of the defamatory allegations
effect actual reader disdain of individuals within the group. The
distinction made by existing slander “per se” categories presents
evidence for such an effect: certain statements require lower
evidentiary burdens at trial because they are presumed to be
damaging or defamatory.462 When emotion provoking statements
are made about a group, an individual who believes them would
more likely entertain a hostile opinion of an individual associated
with the group.463 The severity element of the Test is satisfied
whenever the defamation satisfies any of four of the original
slander “per se” categories.
3. Overcoming Resistance to Bias and the Effect of Negative
Statements on Believability
The Test’s final step determines whether the believability and
severity of the defamation overcome the inferential leaps a reader
must make. This process accounts for the effect of emotioninducing statements on belief bias. Belief bias is the tendency to
forgo independent reasoning and believe a false conclusion
consistent with one’s beliefs, that is, conclusions that are
believable.464 To ensure that the defamation is sufficiently
damaging, the defamation must qualify as so under the four “per
se” categories,465 which are often emotion provoking. Yet,
cognitive studies show that a person’s susceptibility to belief bias
decreases as the reader is presented with statements evoking strong
emotion—people jump to conclusions less easily when presented

462

See supra notes 155–63; see also SACK, supra note 30, § 2.8.
Emotion strongly influences memory. Experiments demonstrate that taboo words
and the colors they were associated with were more easily and robustly remembered.
Donald G. Mackay et al., Relations Between Emotion, Memory, and Attention: Evidence
from Taboo Stroop, Lexical Decision, and Immediate Memory Tasks, 32 MEMORY &
COGNITION 474 (2004). See also Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.J.
308, 312 (1979) (discussing the inability of prejudiced persons to make rational decisions
about individuals).
464
See ROBERT J. STERNBERG & JACQUELINE P. LEIGHTON, THE NATURE OF REASONING
300 (2004).
465
See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
463
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with salacious facts.466 Thus, to satisfy the second part of the Test,
the extent that the defamation is believable must rise to meet
increasing reader skepticism when presented with negatively
charged defamatory material.467
C. Application to Rolling Stone
To begin, determine whether to apply the Test’s analysis. The
Article and Podcast identify Elias and Fowler indirectly, but
individually to a sufficient extent468 placing them outside of the
scope of group defamation.469 Unlike his fellow plaintiffs, the
allegations in the Complaint regarding Hadford never successfully
demonstrate that the Article’s readers could or did identify him
directly.470 Given such, for Hadford to recover he must succeed on
a group defamation theory, making application of the Test
appropriate.

466

See Vinod Goel & Oshin Vartanian, Negative Emotions Can Attenuate the Influence
of Beliefs on Logical Reasoning, 25 COGNITION AND EMOTION 121 passim (2011).
Whether such an effect is apparent in real life defamation remains to be seen.
467
It is important to note that the defamation must provoke emotion in the consumer of
the defamation, and not in the defamed party for this effect to occur. For example, most
professional criticism about a third party does not invoke powerful emotion, resulting in a
reduced resistance to prejudicial bias formation based on the defamation. Professional
criticism of one personally, especially if untrue, provokes an emotional response, such an
effect is unimportant to the analysis.
468
All three plaintiffs contended that they faced a public that was easily able to identify
them as the subjects of the Article. Complaint at 45–52, Elias I, 192 F. Supp. 3d 383
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 15-5953). To satisfy the of and concerning element, the Complaint
alleges that all three were members of the Phi Kappa Psi fraternity. Id. at 45–47. Elias
and Fowler had “proudly listed” Phi Kappa Psi on their social media, while Hadford had
not. Id. at 51–52. Elias was tied to the article by virtue of his room, Fowler by his
participation as rush chair, and Hadford by riding a bicycle on campus after graduating
and wearing fraternity branded clothing. Elias II, 872 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 2017). While
each plaintiff alleges to have been contacted by journalists doing research online, only
Fowler and Elias were confronted or questioned in person, by persons whose statements
suggested their potential involvement in the rapes. Elias II, 872 F.3d 97, 105, 107 (2d
Cir. 2017). Hadford only alleges general inquiries via “message boards and forums,
constant texts, emails, and questioning from peers, and soliciting from reporters.” Id. at
107.
469
See Elias II, 872 F.3d at 105, 107–10.
470
Id. at 107. “The facts alleged with regard to Hadford are ‘merely consistent with . . .
defendant’s liability,’ and are thus insufficient to survive Defendants’ motion to dismiss.”
Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (internal citations omitted).
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The first part of the Test examines whether the defamation of
Hadford’s group necessitates elevated restrictions on recovery.471
The group does not consist of public officials, and members were
not involved in government.472 Whether PKP acted as a public
group presents a more complex question.473 Hadford joined PKP
voluntarily and the group possesses the resources to defend itself,
satisfying two criteria of the Test’s first part.474 Finally the group
appears sufficiently prominent within the University of Virginia
community.475 Hadford and PKP satisfy the Test’s definition of a
powerful group whose individual members would be subject to
restricted recovery.476
Applying the Intensity of Suspicion components of the Test to
Hadford’s circumstances, the second part of the Test reaches an
ambiguous result when considering the Intensity of Suspicion
elements. The group and individual characteristic element is fairly
straight forward.477 PKP is definite in number and composition.
Because approximately thirty percent of students participate in
Greek life at the University of Virginia, PKP is likely well-known
on campus.478 Since Hadford lived in the fraternity house for more
471

See supra Section III.A.
See supra Section III.A.1.
473
See supra Section III.A.2.
474
Id.
475
See infra note 478 and accompanying text.
476
See supra Section III.A.2. In practice, the impact of an elevated standard in
Hadford’s case is unclear aside from the prohibition of the recovery of unproven
damages. In New York, Chapadeau dictates that even private plaintiffs must establish
“by a preponderance of the evidence, that the publisher acted in a grossly irresponsible
manner without due consideration for the standards of information gathering and
dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible parties” whenever “the content of the
article is arguably within the sphere of legitimate public concern, which is reasonably
related to matters warranting public exposition.” Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch,
Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 199 (N.Y. 1975). Sack has noted that this burden approaches that of
the “actual malice” standard elaborated by the Supreme Court. See SACK, supra note 30,
§ 6:4.
477
The dissent in Elias II contends otherwise. Elias II, 872 F.3d 97, 112 (2d Cir. 2017);
see supra Section II.E.
478
In terms of group prominence, approximately thirty-five percent of students
participate in Greek life at the University of Virginia. See Brochure for Fraternity and
Sorority Life at UVA, UNIV. OF VA, 16, http://fsl.virginia.edu/frequently-asked-questions
[https://perma.cc/XP7K-V7HP] (last visited Oct. 24, 2018). Based on current enrollment
statistics, approximately 4,800 undergraduate students participate in Greek life. See id.
472
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than a year after graduating, during which time he rode his bike on
campus and wore fraternity-branded clothing,479 his identification
by some of the community also seems likely.
The analysis becomes more challenging with the remaining
two Intensity of Suspicion elements. The language of the Article
and Podcast contains ambiguity for purposes of the “fraction
implicated” aspect. The majority in Elias read the text to mean that
the Article suggested all members were implicated, while the
district court and dissent disagree.480 To read the Article as
requiring rape for the initiation of all members, or that the Article
sufficiently imputes knowledge of the crime to every participant
requires significant inferences.481 Group size alone does not itself
appear to be prohibitive given the other social aspects of the
fraternity, such as the close connection between members.
However, larger group size might lead a reasonable reader to
question whether the Article truly meant that every member was a
rapist or complicit in the activity.482 Within a group of fifty-three
or even eighty persons,483 one could imagine how at least some
individuals did not participate or have knowledge. Considering
these factors, whether the Article permits a reader conclude that
the article concerned an anonymous group member remains
uncertain.
Because of ambiguity in the result of the Intensity of Suspicion
analysis, the Test’s second part considering bias and perception
comes into play.484 The first step evaluates the likelihood that a
reader considers the source as reliable. Rolling Stone magazine
famously produces entertaining literary485 and sensational
479

Elias II, 872 F.3d at 102, 107.
Id. at 104, 112.
481
For example, while the Article clearly implies that some PKP members may have
been required to commit rape for initiation, it is not a foregone conclusion that all
members were required to do so. See id. at 112 (Loheir, J., dissenting).
482
Indeed, a reader could “also plausibly conclude that, even if all members of Phi
Kappa Psi did not commit gang rape, they all knew that their fraternity brothers had.” Id.
at 109.
483
See id. at 102; see also Elias I, 192 F. Supp. 3d 383, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
484
See supra Section III.B.
485
See, e.g., FEAR AND LOATHING IN LAS VEGAS (Universal Pictures 1998). Hunter S.
Thompson’s story was originally released in Rolling Stone and later achieved commercial
success as a film, but likely said little about the objectivity of journalism at Rolling Stone.
480
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investigative stories,486 in addition to its coverage of music and
culture. As far as reputation for authoritativeness, the magazine
seems to lie somewhere in between a “paper of the record” and a
“supermarket tabloid.”487 It follows that a reasonable reader would
rely on the Article for its truth because of Rolling Stone’s
credibility as a source.
The next step also supports a finding that a reader would rely
on the information presented: the story unfolded as an investigative
expose, backed by sources as well as corroborating facts.488 The
Article contained well-articulated, plausible allegations with
individual reach rather than generalizations, as the portrayal
contained first-hand accounts of the rape.489 The defamatory
statement itself appears plausible, specific, and grounded in fact to
a reasonable reader.
The third aspect of the believability component considers
readers’ existing biases.490 Several large studies491 and high-profile

Id. In fact, Thompson, and the protagonist in his story, prided themselves on embracing
journalistic subjectivity. Id.; see also Brian J. Bowe, A Brain Full of Contraband: The
Islamic Gonzo Writing of Michael Muhammad Knight, 4 LITERARY JOURNALISM STUD.
91, 93–94 (2012) (providing a succinct definition of “gonzo journalism” employed by
Thompson at Rolling Stone and the protagonist in Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas).
486
See, e.g., Michael Hastings, The Runaway General: The Profile That Brought Down
McChrystal, ROLLING STONE (June 22, 2010), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics
/news/the-runaway-general-20100622 [https://perma.cc/4HAF-24ZT]. Publication of this
article ignited a scandal that ended in the firing of General McChrystal.
487
Even following revelations about the Article, media review sites generally deem
Rolling Stone an organization that presents a high degree of factual reporting, considering
it “generally trustworthy for information.” Rolling Stone, MEDIA BIAS/FACT CHECK.COM,
https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/rolling-stone/ [https://perma.cc/WB5U-BV7T] (last
visited Oct. 24, 2018). Northwestern Michigan College Library lists Rolling Stone on its
“credible sources cheat sheet.” ENG 111: English Composition: Credible Sources Cheat
NORTHWESTERN
MICH. C., https://nmc.libguides.com/ENG111/credible
Sheet,
[https://perma.cc/M83D-J97K] (last visited Oct. 24, 2018).
488
See Elias II, 872 F.3d at 102–03.
489
Id.
490
See supra Section III.B.1.c.
491
CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE CAMPUS SEXUAL
ASSAULT (CSA) STUDY (2007); BONNIE S. FISHER ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF COLLEGE WOMEN (2001). The results from the CSA Study
popularized the often-cited statistic that that one in five women has been the victim of
sexual assault at some time in college. P. KREBS ET AL., supra, at xii–xiii.
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cases492 at the time of publication elevated awareness of sexual
misconduct on college campuses. Prominence of the issue in the
public discussion at the time of publication supports the likelihood
that confirmation bias aggravated the defamatory effect.493 Overall,
the believability aspect of the Test’s second part494 supports
recovery for group members.
After considering the believability of the defamation, the Test
evaluates whether the defamation meets the severity
requirement.495 That persons committed gang rape on a college
campus meets even the laxest definition of a grave accusation.496
Taken together, the egregious allegations and convincing nature of
the Article suggest that a reasonable reader would have strong
impetus to form a negative opinion of individual fraternity
members.
The final aspect of the Test’s analysis weighs whether the
defamation and circumstances convincingly overcome resistance to
prejudicial bias formation.497 The salacious and emotion provoking
nature of the Article presents an obstacle, as readers hesitate to
reach even believable conclusions under such circumstances.498
Nevertheless, the inferential gaps discovered in the Test’s analysis
appear surmountable by the Article’s convincing presentation of
heinous behavior. As such, the defamation would likely result in a
consumer with a well formed and powerfully negative opinion of
all members of the organization, strong enough to result in harm to
anonymous individuals. The second part of the Test concludes that
Hadford may recover on a group defamation theory, while the first

492

See, e.g., Andrea Pino, Why Filing an Office for Civil Rights Complaint Against
UNC is Bigger Than Me, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 19, 2013, 12:39 PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrea-pino/unc-sexual-assault-_b_2497326.html
[https://perma.cc/M5HU-PVRM].
493
Importantly, just two years before publication of the Article, a woman published an
article describing gang rape at PKP. See supra note 12.
494
See supra Section III.B.1.
495
See supra Section III.B.2.
496
The Article’s accusation satisfies three of the four slander per-se categories because
it concerns criminal activity and sexual impropriety, and it would injure with respect to
trade, business, profession, or office. See supra notes 155–61, and accompanying text.
497
See supra Section III.A.3.
498
Id.
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requires the demonstration of “actual malice,” and “actual harm”
prior to recovery of any unproven damages.
D. Observations and Criticism
The Test creates a standard with many benefits.499 The
prevention of public officials from recovering on a theory of group
defamation denies the use of suits to silence speech concerning
entities with officially sanctioned power.500 Elevated standards for
unnamed, private individual members would grant publishers and
individuals freedom to explore important issues concerning
powerful groups with a larger margin of error.501 Finally, the Test
facilitates the adoption of a more flexible, permissive framework
for determining whether unnamed plaintiffs may recover following
defamations of their group.502
The Test provides a novel and flexible approach to group
defamation problems, but also raises several important concerns.
The Test applies a plaintiff friendly avenue to recovery under
specific circumstances, where defamation doctrine traditionally
restricts claims. Because of the emphasis on defamatory
credibility, reputable publishers would theoretically face an
increased burden to fact check stories. In addition, the bias
checking element may slow discussion of matters important to
public concern – for example, a report on corruption about an
organization known or suspected to be corrupt by the public runs
an elevated risk of liability if the allegations turn out to be untrue.
Nevertheless, the test does not run counter to the spirit of free
discussion and may actually enhance the quality of public
discourse. For example, many of the Rolling Stone’s critics
contend that the Article did terrible damage to the cause of
underreported sexual assault on campus, because the scandal lends
credence to skeptics dismissive of the need to for increased
sensitivity. Constitutional protections, particularly when applied to
499

These benefits come at the expense of a complex test, as well as the high probability
that the test will at some point deny financial recovery to persons genuinely injured by
false statements merely because they were members of a group involved in a controversy.
500
See supra Section III.A.1.
501
See supra Section III.A.2.
502
See supra Section III.B.
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the group as described above,503 shield journalism and writings
about powerful groups,504 further narrowing the possibility of an
adverse effect on public discourse.
Because the Test potentially harms plaintiffs who associate
with powerful groups, the Test also raises concerns for the freedom
of association, another liberty promised by the First
Amendment.505 However, the Test merely restricts recovery rather
than imposing an outright bar. In addition, the Test’s connection to
a citizen’s associations is remote: the threat of restricted recovery
is unlikely to change a person’s decision to join or dissociate with
a group.506
CONCLUSION
Group defamation presents a complex problem requiring
careful balancing of constitutional interests and a plaintiff’s right
to recover for injury from false statements. This Note evaluates
current methods for determining whether statements about groups
satisfy the “of and concerning” element of the tort, found neither
approach completely satisfactory while integrating aspects of each
into a proposed Test. As part of the analysis, this Note proposes
applying elevated constitutional standards to group defamation
plaintiffs, if and when the group assumed characteristics of a
powerful individual or entity. The novel Test allows a flexible
analysis which protects sensitive public discourse, while permitting
recovery where defamatory statements reach group members
indirectly.

503

See supra Section III.A.
See supra Section III.B.
505
U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1.
506
Cf. Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 2–4, 8 (1971) (prohibiting state
inquiries into an individual’s views or associations for the sole purpose of withholding a
right or benefit). Note that the Test does not cause the state to inquire about a citizen’s
associations; under the group defamation rule, a plaintiff seeks a benefit or right by virtue
of being a group member, a fact he or she volunteers to the state. Nor is the Test’s sole
purpose to withhold a right—the goal is to balance the rights of plaintiffs and defendants.
504

